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Abstract: Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has contributed significantly 
to maize production and productivity and national food self-sufficiency, and has been 
coined as “one of the most successful smart subsidies of the day” (Mapila, 2013, p. 1).  
FISP, however, has increasingly come under fire for various inefficiencies, such as poor 
targeting and financial unsustainability. Given that these are the very challenges that 
smart subsidies are said to address, there is a need to re-evaluate FISP and assess the 
long-term developmental prospects of smart subsidies. This thesis argues that, while it has 
initiated significant productivity gains, FISP has not practiced pro-poor targeting, has not 
promoted private sector development in the subsidised fertiliser retail industry, and has 
been a significant fiscal burden on the state. FISP has not been successfully implemented 
as a smart subsidy, highlighting the limitations of successfully implementing such subsidy 
programmes in the SSA context. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2009 Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, “food security 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food, which meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life” (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2013, p. 16). In the last 25 years, 
there has been a notable decrease in the number of chronically undernourished people in 
the world, with an estimated 805 million people being chronically undernourished in 
2012-2014, a decrease of about 209 million people since 1990-1992 (FAO, IFAD & 
WFP, 2014). Despite this decrease, which can be seen across all regions but to varying 
extents, food insecurity continues to be pervasive, and more so in some regions than in 
others, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. It is imperative that food insecurity be 
addressed as a development issue as it has detrimental effects on “labour productivity, 
health, and education, which ultimately leads to lower levels of economic growth” (Guha-
Khasnobis, Acharya & Davis, 2007, p. 1). Effective responses to other development 
issues such as those pertaining to education, health and child mortality, will require 
progress in improving people’s food security, and so it is of the utmost importance that 
food security be a central goal in development (Guha-Khasnobis et. al, 2007).  
 Food security is a complex goal involving the combination of several food 
security outcomes: food availability, food accessibility, food stability and food utilization. 
Food availability focuses on the quantity of food that is available, also considering its 
quality and diversity through measurements of dietary, energy and protein supplies (FAO, 
IFAD & WFP, 2014). Food access comprises of physical access to food, which takes into 
consideration infrastructure such as road and railway density, and economic access, 
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which is based on domestic food prices and the prevalence of undernourishment (FAO, 
IFAD & WFP, 2014). Food stability is determined by exposure to food security risks such 
as area under irrigation and the value of staple food imports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports, or the incidence of shocks such as fluctuations in domestic food 
supply, food price volatility, and political instability (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2014). The 
final outcome, food utilization, is based on the ability to utilize food, determined by 
access to water and sanitation, with the outcomes of poor food utilization being 
determined through outcomes such as under- or malnourishment of children under five 
and prevalence of anaemia in women who are pregnant (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2014). 
While all of these food security outcomes are of great importance in addressing 
food security, food availability stands as a prerequisite for the other elements, and has the 
potential to translate into the other food security outcomes. Food can be made available 
either through domestic production or imports. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where the 
estimated 33 million smallholder farms in the region equal 80 percent of all farms and 
account for 90 percent of food production, food availability through domestic production 
can also translate into food accessibility as smallholder farmers consume their own 
produce or sell it for income which can be used to buy more food, thus increasing, 
although not guaranteeing, food accessibility (Wiggins & Keats, 2013). An increase in 
food availability can also improve access to food as more productive agriculture may 
result in lower food prices, improve people’s living standards and expand their 
capabilities (UNDP, 2012). Improving food security by increasing food availability 
through domestic production, and especially that of smallholder farmers in SSA is, 
therefore, imperative for the region’s development.  
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Although SSA has made notable progress in reducing its number of 
undernourished people, with 205.7 million people being undernourished in 2010 to 2012, 
a drop from 211.2 million undernourished people in 2008 to 2010, agricultural 
productivity in the region remains low (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2014; FAO, IFAD & WFP, 
2015; UNDP, 2012). The cultivable areas in the region are also poorly irrigated, thus 
contributing to low production and productivity, with only 2 percent of the region’s 
cultivated area being under irrigation, compared to 39 percent in South Asia (Mendes, 
Paglietti & Jackson, 2014; Rasul, 2014). Governments, international institutions and non-
governmental organisations have made efforts to increase agricultural production and 
productivity through introducing different policies, projects and programmes such as 
irrigation schemes and the introduction of new technologies. Agricultural input subsidies 
have particularly regained popularity in the region since the end of the 1990s as 
mechanisms to increase smallholder farmer agricultural productivity by allowing the 
farmers cheaper access to agricultural inputs.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, input subsidies served as a major element of agricultural 
development strategies in the region, but they were largely phased out in the 1990s as part 
of the conditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Shively & Ricker-Gilbert, 2013). SAPs were largely 
based on neoliberal ideals and the belief that the route to development involved economic 
liberalization (which also encompasses free, or open, trade), privatization  (which 
involves the transferral of state-owned enterprises to the private sector), and 
macroeconomic stabilization (which involves subsidy cuts and a cut in government 
spending in social services in order to reduce budgetary deficits as more money would be 
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available to pay off debts), as well as other features aimed at promoting markets and 
private sector-led growth over the state and public institutions (Wilson, 2014). 
SAPs, however, proved to be detrimental rather than beneficial to the region’s 
development, and the removal of subsidies under these programmes resulted in 
agricultural crises such as food shortages as farmers had no support in purchasing inputs, 
and higher food prices, in part because of low food availability (Riddell, 1992). As a 
result, agricultural input subsidies were gradually reintroduced by some SSA countries, 
which has represented, in part, a rejection of the neoliberal policies imposed on 
developing countries that have turned toward a “pragmatic” role for a more “proactive” 
state in providing supports to address “market failures” (UNDP, 2013).  
Since their resurgence, agricultural input subsidies have taken different forms in 
SSA countries in terms of their design, with some being universal in that they are offered 
to all farmers in the country, while others are targeted, being aimed specifically at a set 
criteria of people, such as the poor or those owning a certain amount of land. Other 
differences include the time of implementation, which can be set, meaning that the 
subsidies must be phased out after a certain number of years, or non-existent, which 
means that the subsidy programmes go on without a determined end date.  
With the resurgence of agricultural input subsidies, there has been the emergence 
of “market-smart”, or “smart” subsidies. A smart subsidy “favour[s] market-based 
solutions and aim[s] to promote development of agricultural input markets while targeting 
and enhancing the welfare of the poor” (Tiba, 2011, p. 510). The main characteristics of 
smart subsidies are pro-poor targeting, market-based solutions, which are those 
determined by supply and demand rather than the government and, in the case of smart 
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subsidies, carried out largely through the promotion of the private sector, and an exit 
strategy (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). Smart subsidies are supported by some economists as 
well as official development agencies, such as the World Bank, which has long criticised 
traditional agricultural subsidy programmes, and views smart-subsidies as a preferred 
alternative. Although the very nature of subsidies seems at odds with neoliberal policies, 
smart subsidies offer the possibility of maximising social benefits but in a way that 
market distortions are minimised (Morduch, 2006).  
In promoting market-based solutions while also striving towards enhancing the 
welfare of the poor, smart subsidies are aligned with the post-Washington Consensus 
(Hickey, Sen & Bukenya, 2015; Syed & Miyazako, 2013). Under the post-Washington 
consensus, there is a broadening of development goals such that they go beyond those 
which are measured by increases in GDP to also include objectives such as sustainable 
and more egalitarian development, which was not the case with the Washington 
consensus, or neoliberalism, from which SAPs emerged (Stiglitz, 1998). Smart subsidies 
are compatible with this vision due to their emphasis on special mechanisms to improve 
the welfare of the poor. Moreover, the post-Washington consensus sees the role of the 
government and markets as complementary, with the government playing an essential 
role in addressing market failures so that the markets can perform better, rather than the 
laissez-faire attitude that was proposed under the Washington consensus (Stiglitz, 2008). 
Smart subsidies reflect this through the emphasis on government intervention, in the form 
of subsidies, to address market failures such as credit constraints and imperfect 
competition in supply leading to higher input prices (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). 
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Smart subsidy programmes have been implemented in countries such as Malawi, 
Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Rwanda. While these programmes have had some 
successes, such as increased staple crop production and productivity, they have also 
suffered from some inefficiencies, such as poor targeting, displacement of commercial 
sales by subsidised fertilisers, poor and delayed service delivery, financial 
unsustainability, corruption and political manipulation. This has intensified debate around 
the best way to structure an agricultural input subsidy programme.  
 
Objective and Rationale 
Through the examination of a smart subsidy programme, Malawi’s Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme (FISP), this thesis aims to gain a better understanding of the 
characteristics of smart subsidies, assess their applicability to the SSA context, and 
evaluate the extent to which they are beneficial for agricultural development within SSA. 
In critiquing smart subsidies, it also aims to show the limitations of neoliberal 
development projects, of which smart subsidies can be considered to be a part, in bringing 
about development.  
Gaining a better understanding of input subsidy programme characteristics that 
may be conducive for agricultural development is imperative given that more SSA 
countries are adopting input subsidy programmes, and there is a need to ensure that both 
new and existing subsidy programmes are designed and implemented in such a way that 
inefficiencies are minimised and the best developmental results possible are attained. This 
is a particularly relevant issue to explore at this time given the commitment made by 
African Union member states in 2013 to the Renewed Partnership for a Unified Approach 
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to End Hunger in Africa by 2025, which commits members to implement “a coherent set 
of activities intended to achieve the elimination of hunger in Africa by 2025, 
encompassing a diverse combination of interventions spanning from expansion in food 
production, strengthening social protection mechanisms and the promotion of right to 
food legislation” (FAO, 2015).  It is imperative to study the programmes and projects that 
have been given credit for improving food security and promoting agricultural 
development in SSA, and determine whether or not they are worthy of imitation or offer 
us partial lessons to learn from and build upon. Malawi’s FISP is one such programme, 
featured as a model for other SSA countries to follow in pursuit of agricultural 
development and food security. 
Malawi’s FISP is an agricultural input subsidy programme that was first 
implemented in the country in 2005/06 and is currently ongoing. The programme, in 
which both the public and private sector are involved, provides fertiliser and seed at a 
subsidised cost to smallholder farmers based on a certain criteria. Since its 
implementation, the programme has contributed to significant increases in maize 
production and productivity and national food self-sufficiency, and has been credited as 
“one of the most successful smart subsidies of the day” (Mapila, 2013, p. 1). FISP, 
however, has increasingly come under fire for the various inefficiencies highlighted 
above as challenging other smart subsidy programmes, such as poor targeting, 
displacement of commercial sales by subsidised fertilisers and financial unsustainability. 
Given that these inefficiencies evoke the very challenges that smart subsidies are said to 
address, there is a need to re-evaluate FISP and assess the long-term developmental 
prospects of smart subsidies.  




To what extent does FISP, in practice, actually represent the smart subsidy 




Based on a critical examination of the benefits and limitations of FISP, this thesis 
argues that, while the programme has initiated significant productivity gains, pro-poor 
targeting in its design has not fully translated in the programme’s implementation due to 
corruption, political manipulation and ambiguous and contradictory targeting criteria; 
there has been limited private sector development in the subsidised fertiliser retail 
industry due to government restrictions; and the programme, which lacks an exit strategy, 
has been a significant fiscal burden on the state due to inefficiencies arising from poor 
targeting, political manipulation and poor cost management, as well as dependence on 
expensive fertiliser imports. FISP has, therefore, not been successfully implemented as a 
smart subsidy, and this highlights the limitations of successfully implementing such a 
model in the SSA context.  
While this argument may seem to imply that the challenges lie with the 
implementation of FISP rather than the smart-subsidy model itself, this thesis also goes 
further to argue that the smart-subsidy model presents developmental challenges for 
Malawi through encouraging the promotion of the private sector in fertiliser procurement, 
transportation and delivery, but not in the manufacture of fertiliser, which may result in a 
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perpetuation of dependence on imported fertiliser, and thus ‘development’ based on 
dependence. The model also falls into the ‘local trap’ when it comes to environmental 
sustainability, and its calls for an exit strategy fail to acknowledge the need for continued 
government support for long term development. There is, therefore, a need to rethink the 
smart subsidy model, both because of its limited applicability to the existing SSA context, 
and the developmental challenges that may arise even with proper implementation. 
Given that the smart subsidy model emerges from the post-Washington consensus, 
which largely remains within the confines of neoliberalism, this thesis also argues that the 
shortcomings of the smart subsidy model as a development project highlight the 
limitations of neoliberal policies in bringing about development as they propose minimal 
government intervention and free trade which have never been tried and successful in 
ensuring development. There is, therefore, a need for alternative approaches to 
development, involving a developmental state and interventionist policies that will bring 
about long-term development and prioritise social concerns. 
 
Empirical Focus 
 In order to determine the extent to which FISP, as a smart subsidy, has been 
successful, a number of data needs were identified, mostly based on the three main 
characteristics of a smart subsidy. Data on changes in maize production and productivity 
were necessary in order to highlight some of the successes of the programme under its 
current design. It was also imperative to find changes in targeting at the area and 
beneficiary level in order to determine the extent to which FISP practices pro-poor 
targeting. Finding changes in private sector involvement in FISP was essential in order to 
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determine the importance of the private sector in the programme, as well as the impact of 
FISP on private sector development in various sectors within the programme. Changes in 
the performance of the private sector in commercial input sales was also important to 
determine the impact of FISP on private sector performance outside of the programme. 
FISP does not have an exit strategy, but there was need to assess changes in the 
affordability of the programme for the Malawian government in order to consider the 
need for an exit strategy in the programme based on growing costs and financial 
unsustainability. 
 Documentary evidence was largely depended upon for this thesis. Data collected 
from the documentary evidence covered the years 2005, when FISP was first 
implemented, to 2013, which is the last year for which there is currently adequate and 
reliable data. Years prior to the year of FISP’s implementation were also included at 
times to allow for comparison between periods of time before the programme, and the 
years under which the programme has been implemented. Primary and secondary data 
was drawn from government documents, reports from non-governmental institutions, 
scholarly articles, newspapers, databases and books, accessed either electronically or 
manually. Primary data on maize production and exports was taken from the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations Statistics Division (FAOSTAT), while 
secondary data showing changes in maize yields was drawn from working papers from 
the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) Malawi Strategy Support 
Program. Primary data on poverty levels in Malawi’s regions, which was used to 
determine area pro-poor targeting, was taken from the database of the National Statistical 
Office of Malawi, while government publications from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
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Food Security in Malawi provided data on targeting criteria. The Centre for Development, 
Environment and Policy (CEDEP) at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
at the University of London contains a number of publications under the Evaluation of the 
Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme. Targeting data, data on private sector 
development in FISP, programme costs and budgetary information for the government of 
Malawi, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) and FISP were gathered 
from these publications. A public expenditure review for Malawi from the World Bank 
provided budgetary information and targeting data for FISP.  
 Given that Malawi’s input subsidy programme is well-documented and has 
received much praise as a model for other SSA countries, as well as being heavily 
criticised for its inefficiencies, FISP serves as an ideal subsidy programme to study in 
exploring the characteristics of input subsidies which are most beneficial for agricultural 
development within the SSA context. In view of this, this thesis shall take a case study 
approach in evaluating Malawi’s FISP, analysing it within the smart subsidy framework, 
and situating it in its physical, political and economic context.  
 Although smart subsidies are not exclusive to agriculture, and have also been 
applied to technology, this thesis focuses strictly on smart subsidies as they relate to 
agricultural input subsidies. FISP subsidy packages contain fertilisers, seed and 
chemicals, but focus shall be on fertilisers as they are the largest component of the 
package in amount and value. While focus on fertiliser shall reflect that of both tobacco 
and maize fertilisers, attention on crop production shall exclude tobacco and be paid only 
to maize, in line with the focus on food availability as well as FISP’s aims of food self-
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    12 
 
sufficiency, which are dependent on the production of maize rather than that of tobacco 
which would provide income and increase economic access to food. 
  
Thesis Outline 
 The next chapter presents a discussion on the history of Malawi’s agriculture and 
agricultural subsidies, as well as on the nature of FISP, arguing that the implementation of 
the programme is largely defined by the context within which it is carried out, with 
uneven access to land resources and patronage being some of the defining features of how 
the programme has been implemented. This chapter provides the necessary background 
information in order to situate and analyse FISP within its context, providing a better 
understanding of the programme, its benefits and its limitations.  
 Chapter Three provides a discussion on debates pertinent to this thesis. It begins 
with debates surrounding national food self-sufficiency, the contentious goal of FISP, 
which is not aligned with the neoliberal ideals often put forward for development. Food 
self-sufficiency, although different from food security, stems from food availability in 
that it is determined by the amount of food that is available through domestic food crop 
production, with this food being adequate to feed the entire population. Focus then shifts 
to debates surrounding input subsidies, as well as the role of the state and the private 
sector in development, which are imperative to address given that the smart-subsidy 
model emphasizes the need for private sector development and the minimisation of 
government support through an exit strategy. The chapter proceeds with a discussion on 
debates around national food self-sufficiency in Malawi, followed by a discussion on 
smart subsidies, and the debates surrounding the characteristics of the smart subsidy 
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    13 
 
model under review in relation to Malawi, and ends with a discussion on patronage and 
its effects on development, given that it can be a significant impediment to the successful 
implementation of programmes such as FISP. 
 Chapter Four provides a presentation of empirical research on FISP, as well its 
discussion and analysis, in order to determine the extent to which FISP, as a smart 
subsidy, has been a successful subsidy programme, and understand its limitations. 
Finally, Chapter Five concludes the thesis, discussing lessons that can be learnt from 
FISP about smart subsidies and their implementation in the SSA context. This is followed 
by general discussion on the neoliberal model and its limitations when it comes to 
development. The chapter ends with recommendations for FISP, stating that the 
programme may better serve Malawians with more effective complementary programmes 
in place, increased private sector development in subsidised fertiliser retail, and better 
cost-management, which will include promoting domestic fertiliser manufacturing to 
reduce the country’s dependence on fertiliser imports and encourage long-term 
development. 
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CHAPTER TWO: AGRICULTURE AND SUBSIDIES IN MALAWI 
Over the last five decades, Malawi has, for the most part, been characterised as a 
country with low social indicators, an economy that is highly dependent on relatively low 
productivity agriculture (dominated by its staple grain, maize), and generally lacking in 
other exploitable natural resources (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The country’s agriculture 
is mostly rain-fed, with only about 8.6 percent of total irrigable land being under 
irrigation, including estates, compared to 9.3 percent in neighbouring Zambia, and 2 
percent in neighbouring Tanzania (IWMI, 2009; Hanatani & Sato, 2011; Makoye, 2013). 
Land ownership in Malawi lies at an average of 0.5 hectares per capita, which is a 
significantly small area of land, and serves only as a safety net, while there is a need to 
generate a primary income elsewhere (Chinsinga & Chasukwa, 2012).  
Since its independence in 1964, food self-sufficiency has been a top priority for 
the country in ensuring food security, and agricultural production has been imperative for 
the country’s economic growth and the wellbeing of the majority of the population 
(Yamada, 2008). Agriculture accounts for 39 percent of the country’s GDP, as well as 90 
percent of its export earnings, primarily due to exports of tobacco (Chinsinga & 
Chasukwa, 2012). More than 80 percent of Malawi’s population depends on agriculture 
for its livelihood and 90 percent of the country’s food crops are grown by smallholder 
farmers (Gondwe, 2002; Kishindo, 2004). As a result, the agricultural sector and the 
smallholder farmers within it are an integral part of the country’s economy. This chapter 
explores the different changes in agriculture and, more specifically, agricultural subsidies 
in Malawi in order to provide background information on the country’s agriculture, which 
will aid in the evaluation of FISP. 
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The Colonial Administration  
Malawi was colonised by the British in 1891. Under the colonial administration, 
policies were pursued that furthered the economic and agricultural interests of the 
metropolitan country and the settlers (Ng’ong’ola, 1986). A cash crop economy was set 
up, with the cultivation of export crops such as coffee, tea and flue-cured tobacco, almost 
exclusively carried out by settler estates, while smallholder farmers grew cotton and flue-
cured tobacco as well as economic food crops such as groundnuts and maize, of which 
they were the principal producers (Lodge, Kadima & Pottie, 2002; Ng’ong’ola, 1986). 
In redistributing land, a rural settlement structure was set up, in which “some of 
the most fertile lands were reserved for white farmers, leading to a very skewed 
distribution of land in the country” (FANRPAN, 2006). A colonial land policy was 
implemented, under which all land was appropriated to the British sovereign and native 
rights were redefined as ‘occupation rights’ in order to discourage the establishment of 
land rights similar to those claimed by the settlers (GoM, 2002). In 1951, a land 
ordinance, known as The Land Ordinance of 1951, established land as being either public, 
private or customary, with customary land being a form of public or crown land, thus 
making Malawians on customary land tenants on land they traditionally owned (GoM, 
2002).  
Increasing discontentment over colonial policies, the impoverishment of 
Malawians and a lack of their representation in politics led to a mass political movement, 
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which carried out campaigns against the colonial 
administration and the Federation of Rhodesia into which Malawi had been incorporated 
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in 1953 (Lodge et. al, 2002). In 1964, Malawi gained its independence with Dr. Hastings 
Banda as its first president. 
Before we look at Malawi under President Banda, with particular focus on 
agriculture and subsidies, it is imperative to briefly explore the nature of rule leading to 
independence, focusing on the rise and consolidation of patronage and clientelism as a 
part of political practice. This is particularly important in this instance, as we shall later 
see the use of subsidies as a source of patronage. In acknowledging that SSA is a diverse 
region, it is important to also note that there are similar experiences in some instances, 
and so the following discussion on colonial rule and patronage shall not only refer or 
relate to Malawi, but to countries once under British colonial rule in SSA. This more 
general approach will prove to be beneficial when discussing the limitations of successful 
smart subsidy implementation in Chapter Five.  
 
A Brief History of Colonial Rule, Independence and Patronage 
Patronage and clientelism have become deeply entrenched in the politics of 
Malawi, particularly when it comes to agriculture, given its importance to the country and 
the people highlighted above. Boissevain states that, “patronage is founded on the 
reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron, [he] mean[s] a person who 
uses his influence to assist and protect some other person, who becomes his client, and in 
return provides certain services to his patron” (as cited in Bearfield, 2008, p. 67). 
Clientelism represents the other side of the patron-client relationship, whereby 
“individuals try…to control and affect the political circumstances of their life” (Poggie, 
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1983, p. 663). This can be done through providing political support to a patron in 
exchange of services. 
Under colonial rule in Malawi, colonial policies attempted to undermine 
traditional authority held by chiefs and headmen, and to enforce direct rule in traditional 
administration, but were largely unsuccessful (Lodge et. al, 2002). As a result, a dual state 
was created whereby, simultaneously in existence with direct rule, there was indirect rule 
through traditional authorities, who exercised a large amount of autonomy (Eggen, 2011). 
On indirect rule through chiefs in Africa during the colonial period, Lange (2004) states 
that “[it] was based on a tripartite chain of patron-client relations linking the colonial 
administration to the population via chiefs” (p. 907). The selection of chiefs was based on 
their lineage and, more importantly, their inclination towards cooperating with colonial 
officials (Lange, 2004). Chiefs had great institutional powers and tended to be rent-
seekers upon the occurrence of an exchange between the local population and colonial 
administration (Lange, 2004). Lange notes that, “when independence reforms failed to 
weaken chiefs, this system of ‘decentralised despotism’ provided an effective impediment 
to state governance and broad-based development” (2004, p. 908).  
As discontent with colonial rule and anti-colonial radicalism intensified in 
different African countries, including Malawi, colonial powers were under greater 
pressure to carry out decolonisation, and through a speedy process (Fanon, 2004). 
Colonial powers worked to ensure that the decolonisation process would be designed in 
such a way that would ensure power being passed down to conservative interests by 
concentrating power in the executive so that order could be maintained (Szeftel, 1998). 
Decolonisation was to be achieved through mass elections and, with little notice given, 
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nationalist organisations built their parties and gathered electoral support either through 
relying on individuals who had already acquired a large local following, or used 
clientelist politics in order to gain the support of local notables, and of local voters for the 
candidates (Allen, 1995). Ministries that were handed over to Africans at that time were 
spending ministries, which gave them access to resources that they could use to extend 
and consolidate support (Allen, 1995). Allen (1995) notes that, although clientelism 
proved to be efficient in recruiting and maintaining support, it would also prove to be a 
destabilising force. 
From this, we can see that patronage had its roots from the way in which colonial 
powers applied their indirect rule to traditional authorities, with traditional authorities 
rent-seeking from them as well as their subjects as they acted as intermediates. Patronage 
can also be seen in the decolonisation process and, from a colonial history of it being used 
to gain and maintain power and influence, patronage has become embedded in the culture 
of how politics in Africa are carried out today. It is important to note that this is not to say 
that patronage is inherent in African politics, as it can be found in many other countries, 
but only to emphasize how it has become a common feature in the politics of the 
continent, and can be particularly prevalent in areas of relative scarcity, with battles 
waged over scarce resources. 
 
1964-1994: Hastings Banda, Neoliberalism and Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Banda, from the MCP, was in power from 1964 to 1994. When he came into 
power, Banda favoured the elite class of Malawi, and carried on the focus on estate 
agriculture from the colonial period (with most estates owned by whites), exercising a 
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high degree of intervention and regulation in both estate and smallholder agriculture 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). An import-dependent economy, which is one largely based 
on trade, was developed, with estates producing tobacco for export, while smallholder 
farmers were limited to only growing food crops and low-value cash crops, as well as 
serving as a cheap labour reserve to the estates (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). There was 
also a new land reform policy put into place, having been drawn up in 1963 and 
implemented in 1967. These land reforms, however, did not present a significant 
departure from the previous colonial land policy and highlighted a continued government 
preference and support for large estates and their farmers over customary land as the 
former were seen as essential for achieving rapid socio-economic development such that, 
by 2002, agricultural estates occupied 1.2 million hectares of the 9.8 million hectares of 
land in the country, while smallholder farmers had 4.5 million hectares of land that were 
potentially available for agriculture (GoM, 2002; Zuka, 2013). 
Banda’s support for estates, particularly in the production of tobacco, was used as 
a tool to garner political support, and fertiliser and credit subsidies were provided to 
estates as well as better-off smallholder farmers as a way of political patronage (Chirwa 
& Dorward, 2013a). Poorer smallholder farmers, however, received little attention, being 
considered as less efficient in their land and resource use due to what Banda believed was 
the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in land use, brought about by the communal ownership of 
customary land (Hardin, 1968; Zuka, 2013). The ‘tragedy of the commons’ in land is 
based on the rationale that individuals who communally own a piece of land are more 
likely to seek to maximise their productivity through environmentally destructive means 
as they will share the burden of environmental destruction with their ‘co-owners’, 
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whereas those with private ownership are less likely to do so because they bear the 
burden of environmental destruction on their piece of land on their own (Hardin, 1968). 
There was a desire by the government to move away from largely depending on 
the agricultural sector, and efforts were made to develop the manufacturing sector 
through import-substitution policies. Protectionist policies were put into place to promote 
the growth of the manufacturing sector, which mostly consisted of industries such as soft 
drinks, beer brewing and cheap textiles (Thomas, 1975). From 1964 to 1980, the 
manufacturing sector experienced its highest growth rate to date, but agriculture 
continued to be a dominant sector in the country as rapid export growth was imperative to 
service a growing external debt, as well as to import consumption and intermediate goods 
(Chavula, 2013; Thomas, 1975). However, based on the GDP growth rate, which 
averaged 5.3 percent per annum, as well as the growth of the manufacturing sector, 
between 1964 and 1979, Malawi’s economy performed relatively well compared to the 
1980s (Chipeta, 1993; Chavula, 2013). 
In 1980, Malawi was hit by a number of external shocks. The world prices for 
flue-cured tobacco, an export that Malawi was largely dependent on, collapsed, resulting 
in many tobacco estates going bankrupt (Lele, 1990). Other more immediate causes for 
Malawi’s economic downturn were the oil shock of 1979, which significantly increased 
oil prices for Malawi, and the intensification of the civil war in Mozambique, which 
increased the number of refugees coming into Malawi, creating pressure on resources 
(Chilowa, 1998). The civil war in Mozambique also meant that, for the purposes of trade, 
Malawi had to depend on the longer and more expensive trade routes to the ports in Dar-
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es-Salaam and Durban as opposed to the rail route leading to the ports of Nacala and 
Beira in Mozambique (Mulaga & Weiss, 1996). 
As a result of the country’s economic downturn, the Malawian government had to 
seek financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. In 1981, the first structural 
adjustment loan, with policy conditions, was provided to Malawi, and marked the 
beginning of the liberalization phase in the country.  
In observing Malawi’s economic state, the World Bank (1981) raised concerns 
about Malawi’s narrow export base and the slow growth in smallholder exports, as well 
as increased dependence on imported oil, a worsening financial condition of the public 
sector and growing budgetary deficits due to increasing expenditures. The Bank also 
noted that the country’s balance of payments had deteriorated since 1978, and that terms 
of trade had fallen by 35 percent between 1977 and 1980 (World Bank, 1981). SAPs were 
drawn up for Malawi in order to reduce the budget deficit, improve the balance of 
payments, and allow the market to dictate wages, prices, resource allocation and the 
structure of production (Lele, 1990). Greater attention was also paid to smallholder 
farmers who were largely neglected prior to SAPs, when large estates and better off 
smallholder farmers were the only ones subsidised. SAPs aimed to increase export crop 
production by smallholder farmers through increasing the producer prices for these crops  
while maize (food) prices were kept down, thus encouraging the production of cash crops 
over that of maize (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a).  
In order to improve the finances of the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC), as well as the government budget, under SAPs, fertiliser 
subsidies were to be removed by 1985/86, but the government requested an extension for 
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this elimination, which was granted (Lele, 1990; World Bank, 1983). Renewed pressure 
for elimination, however, came under the third structural adjustment loan due to concerns 
over the government budget deficit (Lele, 1990). By 1987, the ratio of the fertiliser price 
to the maize price ratio was notably high, food stocks were inadequate for Malawi’s 
population, and there was a growing number of refugees coming in from Mozambique, 
where there was a civil war, further straining food supplies (Lele, 1990). The result was a 
food crisis characterised by low maize production per capita and ADMARC was unable 
to purchase maize from smallholder farmers (Harrigan, 2003). These factors, as well as 
Banda’s desire to deliver food self-sufficiency and counter growing calls for political 
change, led to Malawi reintroducing subsidies in 1987 against the conditions of the 
country’s third structural adjustment loan (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a; Kapoor, 1995; 
Lele, 1990). The World Bank responded by reviewing its policy position in Malawi, and 
in 1990, it created a new Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC), which consisted 
of a pilot scheme for fertiliser subsidies that were targeted (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). 
Although maize production responded positively to the reintroduction of subsidies, maize 
shortages continued due to two serious droughts between 1992 and 1994 (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013a).  
 
1994-2004: Muluzi, the Starter Pack Scheme and the Targeted Inputs Programme 
In 1994, after Malawi’s first multi-party elections, Bakili Muluzi of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) came into power as president, serving in this position until 
2004. During his decade of rule, smallholder farmers were given more freedom in terms 
of the cash crops that they were permitted to grow, such as burley tobacco, which was 
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grown successfully and, initially, with good quality (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). On the 
advice of the IMF, however, agricultural input subsidies were completely removed in 
1996 and this, along with the removal of price controls and credit programmes in place 
for input purchase, resulted in an increase in input prices as well as a decline in maize 
availability at the household and national level, causing a severe food crisis (Holden & 
Lunduka, 2010; Mpesi & Muriaas, 2012). Muluzi’s decade of rule was marred by severe 
macroeconomic mismanagement, a decline in the real value of civil service salaries, rapid 
inflation, a dramatic decline in the value of the Malawian Kwacha, and weakening 
government capabilities (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The economic decline in the 
country at that time can be considered to be as a result of a combination of structural 
adjustment and poor management by Muluzi’s government as reforms under SAPs were 
implemented with greater momentum when Muluzi came into power, with further 
liberalisation and deregulation of the economy exacerbating the economic challenges that 
the country had been facing since the 1980s (Englund, 2002). There was also 
opportunistic privatization, and the issuance of government bonds to service budget 
deficits was a significant source of patronage, particularly for the elites who were 
involved in commerce in the south region, where the UDF had its political power base 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). With a plummeting economy, increasing land pressure in 
the south and a decline in soil fertility, a close association of the politics and mass 
patronage embedded in maize self-sufficiency and the politics of fertiliser subsidies 
developed (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). 
As economic and social conditions worsened under neoliberal policies, and fears 
of another food crisis grew in the face of worsening food security, recommendations to 
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distribute necessary inputs to smallholder farmers, made by a government appointed 
Maize Productivity Taskforce, were supported by the ministers of agriculture and finance 
(Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). From these recommendations, in 1998, two years after 
agricultural input subsidies had been removed in the country, subsidies were reintroduced 
under the Starter Pack Scheme, which was funded by the Department for International 
Development (DFID) as a temporary measure (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). 2.8 million 
smallholder households were beneficiaries of the starter packs, which provided them with 
10-15kg of free fertiliser and two kilograms of hybrid seed, and the programme saw a 
notable increase in maize production (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008; Ricker-Gilbert et. al, 
2013). The World Bank and other donors, however, grew concerned with the Starter Pack 
Scheme, which resembled the universal subsidies that were introduced post-independence 
and so, in 2000/01, the programme was scaled down to target the poorest and most 
vulnerable smallholder farmers, and was renamed the Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP)  
(Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). The packs provided under TIP, however, contained inputs 
of lower quality, which contributed to lower maize production growth levels than those 
under the Starter Packs (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). When another food crisis hit in 
2002/03, donors agreed to increase funding and the programme was scaled up, nearing 
universal coverage and becoming the Extended Targeted Inputs Programme (ETIP) 
(Holden & Lunduka, 2010). Despite the provision of subsidies, a drought in 2003/04 
resulted in a substantial national food deficit (Holden & Lunduka, 2010). 
 
Mutharika and FISP 
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In 2004, presidential election candidates of the UDF and MCP incorporated 
promises of different fertiliser subsidy programmes in their campaign (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013a). Bingu waMutharika of the UDF was elected president in 2004 but, 
upon his election, he broke away from the UDF and formed his own party, the 
Democratic People’s Party (DPP). This coincided with a change in staff and management 
in the Lilongwe DFID office, who preferred public works programmes over subsidies to 
improve accessibility to and use of inputs (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). This led to the 
DFID withdrawing financial support from the ETIP in 2004/05, and the DPP attempted to 
unilaterally fund the ETIP that year, but the programme was implemented late, resulting 
in the worst food crisis in Malawi’s history in 2005 (Chinsinga & O’Brien, 2008). With a 
severe food crisis on his hands, as well as a party that had no base in parliament, 
Mutharika introduced a considerably scaled up input subsidy programme in order to gain 
the support of the population over that of the parliament (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). 
This subsidy programme was called the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) – 
although it was renamed the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in 2008/09 – and was 
implemented in the 2005/06 season, against the advice of the IMF and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) (Mpesi & Muriaas, 2012).  
FISP’s objectives are to “improve resource-poor smallholder farmers’ access to 
improved agricultural inputs in order to achieve their and national food self-sufficiency 
and to raise these farmers’ incomes through increased food and cash crop production” 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a, p. 89). Under FISP, each beneficiary household should 
receive two coupons, and each coupon can be exchanged for 50kg of either tobacco or 
maize fertilizer a year for a highly subsidized cost, and a bag of maize seed, either hybrid 
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or Open Pollinated Variety (OPV) for no additional cost (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011; 
Ricker-Gilbert et. al, 2013). For a 50kg bag of subsidised fertiliser, beneficiaries must pay 
MK500, which was US$3.50 in 2007/08 and US$1.50 in 2014, although additional 
amounts of money are often requested by retailers under corrupt practices, leading to 
beneficiaries paying as much as MK5000 (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). MK500 has been 
the additional cost for one bag of subsidised fertiliser since 2009/10, having been MK950 
when the programme first started (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c).  
Fertiliser for the programme is imported, with urea and “mineral or chemical 
fertilisers containing the three fertilising elements nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium” 
being Malawi’s third and fourth highest imports, respectively (WITS, 2015). The fertiliser 
is then supplied by parastatals and private companies, with private companies being 
awarded tenders by the government in order to supply fertiliser for FISP. The fertiliser for 
the programme is then supplied to three depots in the country’s three regions, all owned 
by the Smallholder Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM), a parastatal 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). From there, the fertiliser is transported by contracted private 
transporters to ADMARC and SFFRFM local area markets, where beneficiary households 
can redeem their coupons for the fertiliser. In 2006/07 and 2007/08, both the private 
sector and parastatals were involved in the distribution of subsidised fertiliser.  
In 2007/08, private sector retailers who extended their distribution network into 
areas that were more remote were to be paid a ‘remote areas premium’, which was an 
additional MK100 or MK200 per coupon redeemed, depending on the extension planning 
areas’ previous year’s sales figures (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). Kelly et. al note that this 
resulted in private sector retailers operating in more locations than they had in 2006/07 
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(as cited in Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The government, however, was concerned that, if 
the private sector sales of subsidised fertiliser were greater than expected, ADMARC and 
SFFRFM would be left with unused stocks, and so a financial agreement was signed by 
the Department for International Development (DFID) and Stanbic Bank, whereby 
Stanbic, funded by the DFID, would purchase unsold fertiliser stocks from the 
participating parastatals at the end of the season, and resell them to the government at the 
beginning of the following season, and at the same price (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). At 
the beginning of the 2008/09 season, a time when contract negotiations for private sector 
participation in subsidised fertiliser retail were at an advanced stage, the government 
cancelled the participation of the private sector in this part of the programme because of 
unsubstantiated reports that there had been a misuse of fertiliser coupons, which were 
being accepted in exchange for the sale of other products (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). 
Since the implementation of FISP, Malawi has experienced years of good rainfall 
and no severe droughts, although it must be noted that there have been some regional dry 
spells (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The good rainfall and the programme have 
contributed to significant increases in maize production and yields – although these have 
plateaued over the last few years – as well as maize self-sufficiency at the national level, 
lower household food insecurity and low inflation, given that about 58 percent of what 
makes up the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is food (Chinsinga, 2012; Pauw & Thurlow, 
2014). Malawi also saw a significant increase in tobacco production in the first few years 
of FISP’s implementation, but this declined after 2009, and drastically in 2012, because 
of a drop in tobacco prices on the international market, resulting in FISP withdrawing its 
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support for the crop by providing fertiliser for maize only in 2010/11 and 2011/12 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a; FAOSTAT, 2015). 
Due to FISP’s successes, “Malawi features as a model in international policy 
dialogue for other countries on the African continent to emulate in order to kickstart their 
fledging agricultural sectors as engines of growth and sustainable poverty reduction” 
(Chinsinga & Chasukwa, 2012, p. 67). FISP, however, has not been without its 
challenges, and has been increasingly criticized for inefficiencies such as poor targeting, 
displacement of commercial sales by subsidised fertilisers, poor and delayed service 
delivery, financial unsustainability and political manipulation, particularly in the absence 
of an exit strategy. 
 
The Inefficiencies of FISP 
When it comes to targeting, FISP aims to assist resource-poor smallholder 
farmers, with a beneficiary criteria that places emphasis on poor and vulnerable 
smallholder households. There has been criticism, however, of the ambiguous and 
contradictory nature of the beneficiary criteria, which is poorly applied during targeting 
(Dorward & Chirwa, 2013).  
When FISP was first implemented, the process of targeting occurred in two 
rounds. The first round involved an updating of information for all farm families by 
MoAFS extension staff, with the assistance of village leaders, followed by the 
identification of beneficiary households who met the criteria (Chinsinga & Poulton, 
2014). The second-round of allocations, which was done away with after the 2009 
elections, was less transparent and more generalised in determining beneficiaries, with 
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information on coupon distribution and eligibility not going beyond the district level 
(Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). 
 In 2008/09, the allocation and distribution of coupons to beneficiary households 
was to be carried out in open meetings in order to increase transparency and empower the 
community through participation, rather than leaving the process solely to extension staff 
and traditional authorities (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). In some cases, however, these 
meetings have been more informative than they have been participatory, with farmers 
being informed about the beneficiaries by traditional authorities rather than taking part in 
the decision-making process (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013).  
Another issue that has been raised pertaining to targeting inefficiencies is that of 
beneficiary households not receiving complete subsidy packages. While each beneficiary 
should receive two coupons, there are reports that some beneficiary households only 
receive one coupon, or have to share the value of a coupon with other beneficiary 
households (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). This largely has to do with the number of 
coupons being provided being less than the number of beneficiaries who have been 
allocated coupons (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). The redistribution or sharing of coupons is 
carried out by the village head and it is reported that it is usually the poorest households 
that have to share their coupons or receive coupons through sharing (Chirwa & Dorward, 
2013a; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). 
 Targeting inefficiencies in FISP also include inclusion and exclusion errors, 
whereby poor smallholder farmer households who meet the criteria may be excluded from 
the programme while better off smallholder farmer households are included because of 
administrative errors, patronage and an ambiguous and contradictory beneficiary criteria 
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(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013).This may result in the 
displacement of commercial fertiliser sales with subsidised fertiliser as better off farmers 
may have less need to purchase fertilisers if they receive coupons for subsidised fertiliser 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). Pauw and Thurlow note that “in Malawi, about 18 percent 
of commercially-supplied fertilizer is believed to be displaced by FISP” (2014, p. 3). 
There have also been reports of poor smallholder farmers selling their coupons to better 
off farmers (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The leakage of subsidised fertiliser outside the 
smallholder sector is significant, with only 63 percent and 68 percent of recorded coupon 
issues in 2006/07 and 2008/09, respectively, going to smallholder farmers (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013a). 
 Targeting under FISP at the regional level has also been affected by political 
manipulation, most notably at the regional level. When multi-party elections were 
introduced in Malawi in 1994, it became apparent that there were regional strongholds for 
different parties, with the MCP winning most seats in the Central Region, the UDF taking 
most seats in the Southern region, and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) winning 
most seats in the Northern region in 1994 and 1999 (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). With 
the majority of the country’s population being in the Central and Southern regions, the 
Northern Region was considered a swing-voting region (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014).  
When the UDF won the 1994 and 1999 elections, it had a significant minority in 
the parliament, and so it formed a coalition government with AFORD, awarding the party 
with ministerial positions and the seat of the second vice-president (Chinsinga & Poulton, 
2014). Due to internal discord within the party, however, AFORD lost its influence in the 
Northern Region in 2004, which changed the dynamics of the region, with individual 
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politicians seeking influence in the region through the chiefs and the clergy (Chinsinga & 
Poulton, 2014). For the newly elected DPP government of President Bingu waMutharika, 
which had no base in parliament, the second-round allocations of coupons served as a 
great opportunity to garner support in the North region (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). 
Chinsinga and Poulton note that, it is in these second-round allocations that the 
disproportionate distribution of coupons in favour of the North was most apparent (2014). 
Former President Mutharika allowed influential chiefs and figures to distribute coupons 
during the second-round allocations to their networks, and these figures could also 
“bargain for the number of vouchers they received, in part exchange for their support for 
a government whose future was very uncertain prior to 2009” (Chinsinga & Poulton, 
2014, p. s141).  
In 2009, former President Mutharika was re-elected with a landslide victory and 
the majority of seats in parliament. With his position now secure, and the DPP with a 
majority of parliamentary seats, as well as growing criticism of corruption within FISP, 
the second-round coupon allocations were abandoned (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). The 
political climate of Malawi has, therefore, had a substantial influence on the way in which 
coupons have been distributed regionally. 
 FISP has also been criticised for delays in service delivery, with reports of delays 
in awarding tenders to transporters and input suppliers, beneficiary finalisation, delivery 
of coupon and input subsidies, and delays in payments to private companies for their 
services (Dorward & Chirwa, 2011a). Delays occur for various reasons, with some of the 
delays occurring further along the process, such as delays in the delivery of subsidies, 
being due to delays further up the process, such as delays in the submission and awarding 
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of tenders for input suppliers. There are reports of late coupon redemption due to other 
delays and, with some coupons being redeemed after the first rains, this largely affects the 
farmers’ harvests as they start planting their seeds late (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). The 
varying extents of these inefficiencies shall be further explored in Chapter Four. 
 Corruption under FISP has been a particularly concerning matter, and not just in 
targeting, discussed above but also around coupon redemption. The Anti-Corruption 
Bureau (ACB) of Malawi has brought FISP under investigation and made arrests of 
ADMARC staff for crimes including taking some fertiliser from fertiliser bags for FISP, 
and selling subsidised fertiliser at a higher cost than the official MK500 (Namanja, 2015; 
Nyasa Times, 2011).  
Aside from the programme’s inefficiencies, Malawi’s dependence on imported 
fertilisers is concerning. The country has the mineral resources required to manufacture 
its own chemical fertilisers, but its few fertiliser blending plants have a total capacity of 
about 70,000 metric tonnes of fertiliser (GoM, n.d.). This amount, however, is only 
enough for estate farmers and so, as a result, Malawi is a net importer of fertiliser, 
importing the fertiliser used for FISP (GoM, n.d.). FISP accounts for one tenth of the 
country’s imports, and with such a high dependence on imported fertiliser, this makes 
FISP vulnerable to the volatility of both fuel (for transport) and fertiliser prices (OHCHR, 
2013).  
Dependence on foreign imports in general has to do with the logic of comparative 
advantage in international trade theory, and can be applied to the SSA region. According 
to Wood & Berge, given the continent’s endowments in natural resources but a lack of 
skill, Africa’s comparative advantage is not in manufactures (as cited in Collier, 2000). 
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Based on its comparative advantage, the continent should, therefore, focus on exporting 
natural resource-intensive goods while it imports skill-intensive goods (Collier, 2000). 
This rationale has largely dictated how industries have formed in Malawi, particularly 
under neoliberalism, whereby agricultural production for export continued to be 
promoted. As noted earlier, Malawi mainly exports tobacco and, when SAPs were 
introduced, there was greater encouragement for smallholder farmers to produce cash 
crops under the corporate food regime, which shall receive further attention in the 
following chapter. With an economy that was based on primary industry, the country has 
had to depend on imports for manufactured goods and, prior to its achievement of 
national food self-sufficiency, has also had to import grain. Food self-sufficiency, 
however, as well as the large agricultural sector and inadequate capabilities for domestic 
fertiliser manufacturing have meant that the country has had to become increasingly 
dependent on fertiliser imports in order to contribute to increased productivity.  
After conducting a mission to Malawi in 2013, United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food, Mr. Olivier de Schutter, provided an end of mission statement in 
which he criticized Malawi for its overreliance on chemical fertilisers, which he stated 
could be concealing as opposed to replenishing depleted soils (OHCHR, 2013).  De 
Schutter highlighted that the depletion of soil fertility is “the most worrying sign of 
Malawi’s ecological crisis”, and that there has been continued loss of soil micronutrients 
(OHCHR, 2013). While efforts have been made to encourage the use of organic fertiliser, 
this has been limited in the form of manure, in part, by land pressure which has limited 
livestock ownership, the high labour requirements required for inorganic fertilisers, as 
well as the provision of modern hybrid seeds for FISP from Monsanto and other 
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international and domestic seed companies, which require high levels of fertiliser in order 
to perform well, resulting in beneficiaries of FISP having to continue to depend on these 
imported chemical fertilisers for the sake of their agricultural productivity (Holden & 
Lunduka, 2013; OHCHR, 2013; Wise, 2014). De Schutter emphasizes the need for a 
‘Brown Revolution’ in order to improve soil fertility through different strategies, and 
notes there have been some home-grown organic soil fertilisation technologies that have 
had some notable success, but are yet to receive greater documentation (OHCHR, 2013). 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) and Holden and Lunduka (2012) have also suggested the 
use of inorganic fertilisers with complementary use of organic fertilisers as “economically 
and ecologically efficient processes for increasing land and labour productivity” (Chirwa 
& Dorward, 2013a, p. 269). 
 
Notable Changes in the Country’s Economy Since FISP 
The country’s economy has risen and fallen during FISP’s implementation, with 
macroeconomic instability arising in 2011/12, having been triggered by the devaluation of 
the Malawian Kwacha, which adversely affected other macroeconomic indicators 
(Dorward et. al, 2013). The country, however, managed to recover from the 
macroeconomic challenges of 2011/12, with GDP growth in 2013 estimated at 5 percent, 
from 1.8 percent in 2012 (AEO, 2014). This largely had to do with a fruitful tobacco 
season and a notable recovery in the growth of construction, wholesale and retail traders, 
and manufacturing (AEO, 2014). In September 2013, however, there was the discovery of 
‘Cashgate’, a scandal that involved “the looting of public funds through the Integrated 
Financial Management System (IFMIS). In response to this scandal, donors withdrew 
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budget support for two years, resulting in a deterioration of fiscal conditions in 2013/14, 
including a widening of the fiscal deficit (Kangwele, 2015; Mwanakatwe & Kebedew, 
2015). Donor budget support in Malawi is very important, with 40 percent of the national 
budget coming from foreign aid (Wroe, 2012). 
 
Revisiting Land Distribution 
It is imperative to briefly revisit the issue of poor land distribution in Malawi to 
provide greater context to the country’s current state in terms of land distribution, as this 
largely impacts agricultural productivity for farmers. During the time of Muluzi’s rule, 
growing discontent also developed over land policies and distribution. As a result, a 
Presidential Inquiry into Land Policy reform was set up in 1995, which presented a final 
report to the president in 1999, recommending better protection of customary land rights 
for smallholders who had insecure land tenure and were at risk of the arbitrary land 
conversions which had been taking place under the previous land policy, allowing 
customary land to be taken and converted to private land without the consent of 
smallholders (GoM, 1999). Moreover, it was also recommended that all customary land 
that had been changed to leaseholds be reverted to customary land under traditional 
authorities once the leases had expired (GoM, 1999). The recommendations from the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry formed the Malawi National Land Policy (MNLP) of 
2002 whose main aims are “confirming and securing customary land rights” (Hall, 2010, 
p. 26). The MNLP is, however, yet to be implemented, with some impediments to this 
including the economy’s weak state, a lack of qualified clerks for land registration, and 
long drawn political uncertainties which have resulted in the withdrawal of some donor 
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funds (FANRPAN, 2006). Political unwillingness also stands as one particularly 
significant impediment to implementation as there is a deliberate effort by the 
government to maintain the status quo that has been most beneficial to them, as it has 
allowed them to keep large tracts of land that some of the top officials gained in the 1967 
Land Act, and continue to exercise power over customary land which allows for arbitrary 
land conversions (Chinsinga, 2008; Zuka, 2013). As the implementation of the policy 
stalls, there have been other attacks on land owned by smallholders. The Greenbelt 
Initiative (GBI), a programme set up in Malawi to provide large tracts of land to 
commercial farmers in order to promote agricultural development, has taken one million 
hectares of smallholder target land to give to investors in order to carry out irrigation 
initiatives, as opposed to taking idle land from bureaucratic elites with political 
connections (Chinsinga & Chasukwa, 2012). The issue of land ownership finds its 
relevance in FISP particularly because the small tracts of land owned by many 
smallholder farmers limit their production and productivity, and may also limit their 
potential to use organic fertiliser. 
 
Conclusion 
From this chapter, it can be deduced that the agricultural sector has played a 
considerable role in Malawi’s economy, and continues to do so today. Subsidies have 
played a notable role in the country’s agricultural growth, but they have also been a tool 
of political manipulation and patronage. While subsidies as well as good rains have 
resulted in increases in staple crop production, severe droughts have often limited their 
effectiveness. The newest subsidy programme, FISP, has had its successes, but it has also 
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been criticised for inefficiencies that have affected the effectiveness of the programme. 
Moreover, Malawi’s dependence on imported chemical fertilisers has made it prone to 
volatile fertiliser prices on the international market and also concealed rather than 
addressed declining soil fertility in the country, which may largely affect long-term 
agricultural development in the country. Malawi also has other challenges beyond the 
confines of FISP, but ones which can affect the programme’s effectiveness, such as poor 
land distribution, which makes it difficult for small farmer to be competitive even with 
fertilizer subsidies and poor infrastructure, which limits access to markets More 
generally, this chapter has also explored Malawi’s economy, providing a sense of the 
macroeconomic challenges that the country has been facing due to currency devaluation 
and corruption, which has disrupted donor support, and may also limit the success of the 
programme. These external factors must be kept in mind as they also contribute to 
determining the overall success of the programme.  
FISP’s implementation has been moulded by the context from which it arises. The 
programme must, therefore, be understood and assessed within the context of Malawi’s 
particular history and political economy, in particular as it pertains to the uneven access 
to land and resources experienced by the majority of small farmers, the high dependence 
on imported chemical fertilisers, and the specific political context from which corruption 
and clientelism have emerged.   
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In its broadest sense, this thesis looks at the extent to which neoliberal ideals, 
particularly in the form of trade liberalization, minimal government support for farmers 
and the centrality of markets and the private sector as the lead institutions in the 
agricultural sector can be beneficial to the development of a country when the right, post-
Washington consensus policies are added to the mixture. Robert McChesney (1999) notes 
that, “neoliberalism is the defining political economic paradigm of our time” (p. 7). The 
neoliberal agenda emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and, since then, has been promoted by 
the dominant international financial and trade institutions such as the IMF, the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as by many developed countries. 
It has guided trade and loan agreements between countries, as well as between countries 
and institutions, and has largely been imposed on developing countries over the years, 
although some Southern policy makers have also been quite receptive of these policies. It 
has defined agricultural policies in pursuit of economic growth, but has come under great 
criticism for its shortcomings in achieving this goal, and for failing to address human 
development and promote environmental sustainability (Broad & Cavanagh, 1999; 
Stiglitz, 1998). In order to address these shortcomings and strike a sort of balance 
between free markets and economic growth and human development, there has been the 
rise of the post-Washington consensus, which informs the characteristics and objectives 
of smart subsidies such as FISP (Stiglitz, 1998).  
Keeping in mind the tensions that exist between the Washington Consensus, the 
post-Washington consensus and their alternatives, this chapter explores the different 
perspectives as applied to national food self-sufficiency, government support in the form 
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of input subsidies, and the role of the state and the private sector. These issues have 
become increasingly contentious as the neoliberal paradigm is met with greater 
opposition on these matters. The chapter shall then focus particularly on the debates 
surrounding national food self-sufficiency in Malawi, followed by a discussion on smart 
subsidies and the debates surrounding their main features and how they relate to FISP. 
The chapter will end with a discussion on corruption and patronage, and its effects on 
development, given that patronage is a notable impediment to the successful 
implementation of programmes such as FISP. 
 
The Goal of National Food Self-Sufficiency 
Countries have the option of making food available for their populations through 
domestic production or imports through purchase or aid. Almost all countries use some 
combination of these options, but there are those which have decided to pursue with 
greater emphasis national food self-sufficiency, which is defined as “the ability of a 
region to sustain its own requirement for food” (Luan, Cui & Ferrat, 2013, p. 393), as 
opposed to largely depending on cash crop production, which would enable the purchase 
of food from the international market through foreign exchange earnings coming in from 
sales. When the independence period in SSA started in the 1960s, the countries in the 
region were essentially food self-sufficient. The introduction of SAPs in the 1980s and 
1990s led to import dependence, which had a negative impact on domestic smallholder 
farmers. These policies led to depressed prices and the flooding of agricultural markets on 
which smallholder farmers had to compete, worsening socioeconomic conditions for the 
farmers and leading to a decline in domestic cereal production and often food crises 
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(Weis, 2007). As a result, there has been growing support for food self-sufficiency in 
SSA, with countries such as Zambia and Malawi more actively pursuing this goal.  
Dependence on the international market for food continues to be widely supported 
by prominent economists and powerful international institutions who argue that, when 
global food production is compared to local food production, there is lower variability of 
production for the former than there is for the latter as the increases and decreases in food 
production are less pronounced on a global scale than they would be on a local scale 
(Ruppel & Kellogg, 1991). Depending on a market with lower variability of production 
when it comes to food gives some stability to food prices (Ruppel & Kellogg, 1991). 
Proponents of global market integration also state that relatively limited restrictions that 
exist on food exports globally, combined with the improvement in transportation systems, 
have made food easier to transport across the world, leaving national food self-sufficiency 
as an option with little economic feasibility (Panagariya, 2002). The argument for 
depending on the international market for food is also rooted in the belief that global 
market integration creates pressure for production everywhere to be based on the 
rationality of comparative advantage, which will result in the global economy becoming 
more efficient, with maximised production, stabilized supply and stabilized low prices 
(Weis, 2007). The reality of the rationale behind global market integrations has, however, 
been questioned and opposed by some economists (Akram-Lodhi, 2013; Chang, 2008; 
Weis, 2007). 
Criticism of depending on the international market for food is largely based on the 
uneven playing field on which countries must operate. Stiglitz (2003) notes that Western 
countries have pressured developing countries to eliminate trade barriers through trade 
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agreements yet they have strategically maintained their own, thus creating a barrier to 
developing countries exporting their agricultural products and denying them of much 
needed export income. With subsidies being discouraged in developing countries while 
developed countries heavily subsidise their farmers (discussed in the next section), 
smallholder farmers in developing countries must compete on the market with the 
subsidized agricultural production of developed countries. Western countries have also 
maintained their quotas and non-tariff barriers on various goods ranging from textiles to 
sugar, while insisting that developing countries keep their markets open to imports from 
wealthier countries (Stiglitz, 2003). This has worsened the terms of trade for developing 
countries as the value of their imports far exceeds that of their exports (Stiglitz, 2003). 
O’Hagen (1976) provides a perspective that contests claims of domestic price stability 
due to the international market, noting that “countries have faced considerable difficulties 
arising from fluctuat[ing] import prices of food and feed” (p. 359).  
For those in opposition to the current food system under which many countries are 
dependent on the international market for food, the global food crisis of 2007/08 probably 
presents itself as one of the greatest indications of a problematic food system. The global 
food crisis came about when international cereal prices, which had been increasing since 
2003 reached their peak in mid-2008, driving more than 130 million people into poverty, 
according to the World Bank, and adding about 75 million people to the population of 
malnourished persons, according to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO) (Headey, 2011). By the end of 2007, there had been a 75 percent increase 
in food prices since 2005, and world grain reserves reached a low of 54 days (McMichael, 
2009).  
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The underlying causes of the rise in food prices have been quite contentious, but 
factors resulting in the surge of food prices include the use of food to create biofuels, 
largely driven by the need to find alternatives to fossil-fuels, rising energy prices, poor 
harvests because of an increasingly variable climate, speculation on the commodity 
futures market, increased demand from fast-growing economies such as China, and 
monopoly pricing by agribusiness, under which food prices were inflated and “globally 
transmitted under the liberalized terms of trade associated with neoliberal policies” 
(McMichael, 2009, p. 281; Watson, 2012). With smallholder farmers having to compete 
with low subsidised produce coming in from the North in the 1980s and 1990s, there was 
a move from rural to urban areas as farming proved to be less profitable, thus reducing 
supply for an increasing demand. As food prices started to increase in the 2000s, and with 
a fall in subsistence farming, many people in developing countries had to turn to 
depending on purchasing food at high prices determined, in part, by agribusiness with the 
intention of increasing profits, but this was an unaffordable option to many (Akram-
Lodhi, 2013; McMichael, 2009). 
Rosin, Stock and Campbell warn against framing the global food crisis as an 
event, as some have, as it weakens the ability to respond to challenges to food security in 
positive and meaningful ways (2012). Headey and Fan state that, “if higher prices in 2007 
and 2008 were at least partly the result of fundamental pressures on international cereal 
markets, then it is reasonable to expect prices to remain high in the years to come” (2010, 
p. xii). Watson claims that part of addressing the global food crisis and working to avoid 
its recurrence involves trade-policy reform which will equalize the playing field on which 
countries participate in trade (2012). 
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Proponents of self-sufficiency also claim that policies supporting food self-
sufficiency are particularly beneficial to the vulnerable and poor in a country (Chandra & 
Lontoh, 2010; Kent, 2002). Weis (2007), however, highlights that self-sufficiency does 
not always translate to every household becoming food secure. In India in the 1960s, for 
example, when input subsidies were introduced, food self-sufficiency was based on 
ensuring that domestically produced grains met aggregate demand and were supplied at 
relatively consistent prices, without considering the food security of each household, 
resulting in great distributive inequalities within the country (Weis, 2007).  
While depending on the international market for food may mean that there is a 
constant source of food on the global market, fluctuating food prices may have 
detrimental effects on developing countries. Moreover, with trade agreements and 
conditions that are skewed in favour of developed countries, who continue to oppose 
trade barriers and subsidies while maintaining them in their own countries, developing 
countries must compete on international markets at a disadvantage as they sell exports for 
foreign exchange earnings which will allow them to purchase food on the international 
market. In the face of this inequality and instability, and with a global food crisis that 
serves as proof of a problematic trade and food regime, it is imperative for developing 
countries to produce their own food as they work towards greater food security, and more 
so in a way that benefits the weakest and poorest sections of their population. 
 
The Use of Agricultural Subsidies 
In order to achieve national food self-sufficiency, many Southern countries need 
to increase their food crop production so that supply can meet or exceed the aggregate 
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demand. One of the ways that some countries in SSA such as Zambia and Malawi have 
decided to do this is through the introduction of agricultural subsidies. Subsidies have 
been a highly contentious matter since the 1980s, with debates arising over whether or not 
governments should spend money subsidising their farmers in order to increase 
production, thus interfering with the market, which neoliberals state would lead to its 
inefficiency, distorting market signals, and propping up inefficient and unproductive 
farms. 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, agricultural subsidies were a distinct characteristic 
of agricultural policies in SSA, given their ability to increase productivity and encourage 
the use of new technology (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). Due to some economically 
unsustainable policies such as those involving import substitution industrialisation 
strategies and state-led investments, as well as external factors such as the oil crisis of 
1979, where the price of oil drastically rose, some countries in the region found 
themselves facing macroeconomic challenges and in significant debt, and so the IMF and 
World Bank introduced SAPs which, amongst a variety of neoliberal policies, called for 
the liberalization of input markets and discouraged agricultural subsidies in order to cut 
government spending and promote economic growth (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). The 
Berg report that was issued by the World Bank in 1981 claimed that input subsidies were 
a notable characteristic of fiscally and economically unsustainable policies that were 
distortionary towards market incentives, affecting competitiveness and farmer incentives, 
as well as undermining the development of the private sector (Dorward, 2009, p. 8). 
Crawford et. al notes that the liberalisation of input markets under structural adjustment 
led to a decline in input use and, resultantly, a decline in agricultural productivity (as 
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cited in Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). As a result of the failed SAPs, there has been a 
resurgence of input subsidies in some SSA countries such as Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Zambia and Rwanda. 
Despite the failure of SAPs and the detrimental effects of removing agricultural 
input subsidies, opposition to input subsidies continues. Although he is not of this 
opinion, Rosset notes that subsidies continue to be understood as “the principle source of 
unfairness in the global system of agricultural trade” (2006, p. 28). Some economists see 
the development of developing countries as being contingent on neoliberal policies, 
arguing that free markets and the rejection of government intervention are necessary for a 
country’s development. Chang (2008), however, notes that most developing countries 
have performed poorly under free trade. Through a historical analysis of the economic 
growth of rich countries, Chang highlights how developed countries depended on 
government support for the growth of some of their industries in as early as the 19th 
century, and some continue to depend on agricultural subsidies today, with an estimated 
US$100 billion being given out by rich countries to their farmers each year (2008; Rosset, 
2006). He notes that policies that discourage the use of input subsidies by developing 
countries in order to promote economic growth are, therefore, a reflection of how some 
developed countries have ‘kicked away the ladder’ that they climbed to reach 
development such that developing countries cannot achieve the same goal (Chang, 2008). 
In agriculture, developed countries benefit from this as it allows them to dominate 
agricultural markets, and their farmers have a higher likelihood of staying in business as 
their produce remains in high demand. For Chang (2008), it is imperative that there be 
government support as developing countries work towards economic and human 
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development, with a gradual withdrawal of this support as these countries develop. Rosset 
agrees with Chang, stating that, “no country currently considered ‘developed’ got that 
way without government supports for agriculture” (2006, p. 76). 
Rosset notes that many developed countries heavily subsidise their farmers, with 
the greatest share of the subsidies in the USA and the EU going to the wealthiest farmers. 
Between 1995 and 2002, farm subsidies in the USA totalled an amount of US$114 
billion, with the wealthiest one percent of farmers receiving an average of US$214,088 
per annum, while the wealthiest 20 percent received an average of US$9,916 per annum 
(Rosset, 2006). Today, about $20 billion a year is spent on subsidising farmers in the 
USA (The Economist, 2015). Rosset (2006) notes that subsidies provided by developed 
countries encourage excess production of the subsidised product, which is dumped on the 
global market at prices that are below the cost of production. As a result, the prices of the 
particular product are driven down, and this affects the developing countries which 
depend on exports of that product to earn foreign exchange but whose production cannot 
compete with the subsidised product from developing countries. This has been the case 
with cotton, which is heavily subsidised by the USA, and has affected countries such as 
Chad and Burkina Faso, where five to 10 percent of the GDP is accounted for by cotton 
(Rosset, 2006). In a case where a country has tried to bring the USA to the WTO for its 
distortionary subsidies, there have been limitations. In 2002, Brazil was able to 
successfully challenge USA cotton subsidies through the WTO, but the USA has been 
able to continue subsidising its cotton farmers in ways that are not consistent with the 
WTO through reaching an agreement with Brazil in 2014, whereby the USA will pay 
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    47 
 
Brazil a $300 million lump sum payment to buy the latter country’s silence and continue 
with its distortionary subsidies (Hopewell, 2013; Pelc, 2014).   
The impact of fertiliser subsidies is particularly noted as beneficial for small 
farmers with low accessibility to fertiliser, a significant barrier to agricultural productivity 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). Advocates for input subsidies credit them for bringing food 
prices down, which improves the wellbeing of many households as resources can be 
redirected to other needs (Ricker-Gilbert et. al, 2013). Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) 
argue that fertiliser subsidies are beneficial in that they can contribute to an increase in 
fertiliser use and agricultural productivity, but in the absence of other supporting factors, 
they are inefficient in achieving agricultural production and poverty reduction objectives 
as there may be other hindrances to increased agricultural production and poverty 
reduction, and there may be need for other investments such as social transfers and 
infrastructure development. 
Some members of the academe are, however, less optimistic, stating that, in 
comparison to other alternatives such as credit subsidies, input delivery programmes and 
output price supports, fertiliser subsidies are an inferior policy option as they fail to 
adequately confront some of the main problems that result in low fertiliser use, such as 
restraints in supply and credit (Crawford, Jayne & Kelly, 2006). Some studies have made 
attempts to draw parallels between India’s experience of fertiliser subsidies, which were 
introduced in the 1960s and resulted in notable agricultural growth, giving rise to the 
Green Revolution, and those of SSA. Kelly, Adesina and Gordon (2003) note that the 
contribution made by fertiliser subsidies to India’s agricultural growth is one that can be 
used to oppose the anti-subsidy stance of many donors. The stark differences between 
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India and SSA, however, such as the relatively high levels of irrigation, high levels of 
rural literacy and more extensive infrastructure in India, reflect that what worked in India 
may not necessarily work in SSA, unless it is part of an overall package of agrarian 
reforms (Kelly et. al, 2003). Rashid et. al. add to this argument, stating that, in Asia, there 
were other complementary public policies, such as agricultural output pricing policies, 
working in conjunction with input policies to bring about increased production and 
productivity (2013).  
It is imperative that lessons be drawn from history when considering the 
usefulness of policies for development. While most economists continue to see free 
markets as imperative for development, the history presented by Chang (2008) highlights 
the need for developing countries to subsidise their farmers as government protection and 
support has been an integral part of the development of rich countries. Seeing subsidies as 
the main source of unfairness in agricultural trade on the international market, as is stated 
by Rosset (2006), has more to do with the highly subsidised agricultural products of the 
Global North with which the Global South must compete. For example, in 2006, cotton 
production in the USA held a significant global market share of 40 percent which, 
according to Brazil, would fall by 29 percent without subsidies, while also raising cotton 
prices and benefit other producers (Rosset, 2006).  
Given that the USA has not had to comply with the ruling made by the WTO 
regarding its distortionary cotton subsidies, opting to pay Brazil off instead, this shows 
that there are limitations to confronting the uneven playing field that is the international 
market when powerful, developed countries are at play, and smallholder farmers in 
developing countries can continue to be disadvantaged in international trade for as long as 
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powerful countries can afford to bypass WTO rulings and continue to heavily subsidise 
their farmers. Given that wealthy farmers in developed countries are subsidised, and 
subsidies are seen as imperative for the economic growth of developed countries, it 
should only be expected that poorer smallholder farmers in developing countries receive 
support from their governments, and that the countries’ economies benefit from that. 
Donovan’s criticism of input subsidies as an inferior policy due to their inability to 
confront the root causes of low input use has some merit, but when low input use is 
because of unaffordability rather than availability, input subsidies may serve as an 
effective measure to ensure access, provided that the nature of the subsidy programme is 
effective in reaching those who are unable to afford inputs. Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 
however, raise a valid point in stating that there is a need for complementary programmes 
and projects to ensure that input subsidies increase production as well as reduce poverty, 
and it is imperative that other mechanisms be in place alongside subsidy programmes to 
ensure their relative success, as has been the case in India compared to much of SSA.  
 
Food Sovereignty 
In looking at the arguments surrounding the use of agricultural subsidies, it is 
imperative to briefly explore some of the arguments surrounding food sovereignty, and 
particularly in terms of the use of chemical inputs, which may be encouraged under some 
agricultural input subsidy programmes. Although the concept of food sovereignty differs 
from the food concepts on which focus has been placed in this thesis, it cannot be 
overlooked given the importance of chemical inputs in many agricultural input subsidy 
programmes, especially when there is a need to maximise food productivity in order to 
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achieve food self-sufficiency, and it is believed that chemical inputs can achieve the 
desired productivity, but there are also concerns of farmers having little power over the 
inputs they may use, as well as environmental concerns.  
Food sovereignty, which emerged in response to the uneven playing field that is 
the international market, is defined as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally 
appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agricultural systems” (Nyéléni Declaration, 2007). This 
concept, put forward by Via Campesina, an international peasant movement, in 1996, also 
“includes the right to regulate and protect food and agricultural production and to shield 
countries from the dumping of agricultural surpluses and low-price imports” (Akram-
Lodhi, 2013, p.151). We can see how this concept applies to a country deciding to pursue 
national food self-sufficiency as opposed to depending on the international market for 
food, but it is also worth exploring in the case of the use of chemical inputs, which are 
largely disseminated in some agricultural subsidy programmes. 
Under the increasingly dominant industrial food system, there has been greater use 
of high-yielding varieties and hybrid seeds, chemical fertilisers, higher dependence on 
petroleum and agrochemical inputs, top-down approaches when it comes agricultural 
extension schemes and corporate-controlled scientific research (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). 
This system is largely criticised by some because of the dependence on imported 
chemical inputs by developing countries, the environmental degradation that arises from 
the use of these inputs, and the marginalisation of smallholder farmers in terms of 
defining their terms of production (Akram-Lodhi, 2013; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Suppan, 
2008). Smallholder farmers’ who are a part of this food system have been placed on the 
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‘chemical treadmill’, as they must respond to new seed types by using new chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides in order to maximise productivity, while abandoning their 
organic inputs and becoming more dependent on imports of chemical agricultural inputs 
(Altieri, 2009). The response to this has been the development of alternative production 
systems such as agroecology-based production systems, which are “biodiverse, resilient, 
energetically efficient, socially just and comprise the basis of an energy, productive and 
food sovereignty strategy” (Altieri & Toledo, 2011, p. 587). Using techniques that are 
developed through farmers’ knowledge and experimentation, these production systems 
promote the recycling of nutrients and energy, the enhancement of soil organic matter and 
biological activity, plant diversification and the integration of livestock and crops in order 
to optimize the productivity of the entire farming system (Altieri & Toledo, 2011).  
Food sovereignty has, however, been criticised. Jansen (2015) states that 
production systems that promote food sovereignty, such as agroecology, cannot always be 
considered to be applicable to every environment. In cases where organic farming has 
resulted in high outputs, this may be due to a natural resource-rich environment, but may 
not necessarily be the case in a marginal region with poor natural resources (Jansen, 
2015). Jansen (2015) also criticizes the discouragement of external inputs such as 
fertiliser by agroecologists on the basis that it may be problematic in areas where low 
external input use results in low output or the depletion of natural resources. Critics of 
food sovereignty also warn against the assumption that peasants and/or smallholder 
farmers are a homogenous group, and that farmers defining their own agricultural systems 
may mean that they may choose systems that are not aligned with agroecological thinking 
(Bernstein, 2014; Jansen, 2015). Jansen (2015) provides the example of small farmer 
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demonstrations by an organization in Costa Rica that is a member of Via Campesina, in 
which farmers called for less regulations on pesticide imports in order to reduce their 
price. Perhaps one of the most significant arguments put forward by critics of food 
sovereignty is that there is a need to maximise productivity in order to meet the demand 
for food by populations, and agroecology is unable to meet that demand (Bernstein, 2014; 
Jansen, 2015). A study carried out by de Ponti, Rijk and van Ittersum (2012) found that, 
“on average, organic yields are 80 [percent] of those obtained under conventional 
agriculture” (p. 4). Jansen (2015) states that agroecology, under which no external inputs 
are used, has even lower yields. 
It is important for smallholder farmers to be able to define the terms of their 
production, and protect their environment by choosing farming methods and inputs that 
they believe are most beneficial to them, as opposed to having the terms of their 
production and resulting state of their environment decided by multinationals. The 
warning put forward by Bernstein (2014) and Jansen (2015) against assuming that all 
smallholder farmers are homogenous, however, must not be ignored, and the possibility 
of smallholder farmers choosing to use chemical inputs must be acknowledged as an 
exercise of their right to define their terms of production. It is imperative, however, that 
the ‘local trap’, in which it is assumed that decisions and actions organized at the local 
scale are more likely to have preferred ecological and social effects than those organized 
at other scales, is avoided and that there is an acknowledgement that the different ways in 
which farmers choose to define their terms of production will not always be the most 
beneficial (Brown & Purcell, 2005).  
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The issue of productivity is very important in this matter, given that there is a 
growing demand for food and the use of chemical inputs produces higher yields than 
organic farming. In Vietnam, through intensive use of chemical inputs, the country has 
become the world’s second largest coffee exporter in a relatively short amount of time, 
but this has had detrimental effects on the environment (Fridell, 2014b). Rapid 
agricultural growth and high yields which may improve the livelihoods of farmers may 
depend on intensive use of chemical inputs, but this may be at the expense of the 
environment. There is a need to find some sort of middle ground, and much research yet 
to be done to find what that middle ground will look like. 
  
The Private Sector and the State 
Closely aligned to the arguments regarding government assistance through 
subsidies in the agricultural sector is that of the role of the private sector in relation to that 
of the state in agricultural development. To understand these arguments, it is imperative 
to briefly discuss and analyse the debate surrounding privatization, which is the 
conversion of state-run firms and industries into private ones. Privatization is seen by 
many as imperative for economic growth, with the private sector being seen as more 
efficient than the state sector in carrying out its operations and managing its assets (Poole 
Jr, 1996; Stiglitz, 2003). Stiglitz states that, “the rhetoric of market fundamentalism 
asserts that privatization will reduce what economists call the rent-seeking activity of 
government officials who either skim off the profits of government enterprises or award 
contracts and jobs to their friends” (2003, p. 58). In other words, the private sector is 
perceived to be less prone to corruption. Economists such as Sachs emphasize the need 
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    54 
 
for privatization for rapid market transformation and economic growth, as they emphasise 
the need for the free markets under which there is no government intervention (Wilson, 
2014). Privatization is also encouraged based on the soft budget constraint theory, first 
put forward by Hungarian economist, Janos Kornai, which argues that, in the event that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) make losses or face bankruptcy, they can secure 
additional loans from the government, which allows them to act as though their budgets 
have malleable, or ‘soft’ limits, and get away with careless management (Chang, 2008; 
Kornai, Maskin & Roland, 2003). In order to illustrate the soft budget constraint problem, 
the ‘sick enterprises’ of India, such as Scooters India, Hindustan Shipyard, Hindustan 
Cables and, more recently, Air India and Mahanagar Telephone Nigar Ltd. (MTNL), are 
often cited as examples of this when it comes to SOEs (Chang, 2008; The Economic 
Times, 2015). 
Chang (2008) cautions against attributing certain characteristics to SOEs alone 
with the assumption that the same flaws do not exist with private firms. He notes that 
there are plenty of SOEs that are functioning well, and so poor performance or 
inefficiency is not an inevitable trait of theirs (Chang, 2008). Examples of these well-
functioning SOEs include the most efficient steel mills globally, set up and run by the 
governments of Taiwan and Korea (Stiglitz, 2003). As for the soft budget constraints 
theory, Chang (2008) argues that private sector firms that are politically and economically 
important can also receive subsidies or government bail-outs. He provides the example of 
Rolls Royce in 1971 and British Steel in 1977, which were nationalised by the British 
government as they suffered due to the industrial decline of the 1960s and 1970s (Chang, 
2008). Export subsidies being provided to Bombardier by the Canadian government in 
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order to gain competitive advantage, as the high-tech sector is of great importance to 
Canada, are another example of significant state support to a private company because of 
its economic and political importance (Froese, 2010). 
Stiglitz notes that the evidence that shows that privatization will effectively 
address rent-seeking and corruption is negligible, and privatization may actually serve to 
encourage corruption and rent-seeking, with government officials “selling [a] government 
enterprise[s] at below market price [so] they [can] get a significant chunk of the asset 
value for themselves rather than leaving it for subsequent officeholders” (2003, p. 58; 
Szeftel, 1998). He also states that, in the absence of appropriate market institutions and 
legal structures, private institutions may not efficiently manage their assets (Stiglitz, 
2003). 
Although the IMF assumes that markets arise to fill the void created by the 
government failing to meet certain needs, Stiglitz claims that in reality there are many 
government activities that have arisen due to markets failing to provide certain services 
(2003). Stiglitz (2003) gives the example of social security systems, disability and 
unemployment insurance systems in Europe, which were not provided by the private 
sector, prompting the government to step in. Furthermore, Stiglitz (2003) warns against 
eliminating government enterprises, claiming that they may leave a void that may have 
detrimental effects on the population as they wait for the private sector to fill that gap.  
The idea of a natural free market without state involvement is one that 
McChesney labels ‘mythical’ (1999, p. 13). In line with this argument, Fridell (2014a) 
highlights the centrality of the state’s role in the global coffee economy, arguing that the 
state and market cannot be separated, and that states can, and often do, control the market. 
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For Fridell, acknowledging the state’s centrality does not translate to seeing the state as 
always being good, but recognizing that it is always there (2014a).  
In neoliberal times, there has been a tendency to demonize the state. SOEs that 
have been successful and are efficient exist, and this should be seen as something that is a 
possibility for other SOEs. Chang (2008), therefore, makes a good claim in rejecting the 
inevitability of inefficiency in SOEs. Moreover, as Chang (2008) highlights, soft budget 
constraints may exist for both private and public sector firms, based on their economic 
and political importance, and so should not be seen as a shortcoming for SOEs only. The 
state has a responsibility to its citizens, and so it stands as imperative that it provides 
services that are needed rather than waiting for the private sector to get involved while 
people are met with the challenges of not having that particular service as they wait. The 
inseparableness of the market and the state, as well as the state’s centrality, highlighted by 
Fridell (2014a), emphasizes the extent to which a free market is questionable in reality.  
In the end, I would argue, it is essential to have a healthy private sector in order to 
cultivate competition that may encourage the efficiency of SOEs, but the state sector must 
not be marginalized as it is accountable to its citizens and must influence the market in 
such a way that is most beneficial to them and the country’s development.  
We have already looked at arguments that call for minimizing state sector 
involvement, but now we must turn to arguments about state sector involvement when it 
comes co comparative advantage as part of understanding the state’s role in development. 
 
The State and Comparative Advantage 
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Opposed to a neoliberal approach that calls for minimal government involvement 
for economic growth, Justin Lin, a former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of 
the World Bank, claims that, given the presence of market failures in developing 
economies, the state cannot take a laissez-faire approach, and must intervene in the 
market, but as a facilitating state, which is “a state that facilitates the private sector’s 
ability to exploit the country’s areas of comparative advantage” (Lin & Chang, 2009, p. 
484). In developing countries, this will mean a focus on production activities and services 
that are labour- and resource-intensive (Lin & Chang, 2009). Lin warns that if the 
government does not support the existing comparative advantage, it may be more costly, 
increase the need for protection of the industries in order to encourage firm involvement 
with the state playing a more permanent support role, which may also lead to rent-seeking 
(Lin & Chang, 2009). 
Chang agrees with Lin that the state needs to play an active rather than passive 
role in development, but argues that, if a country aims to upgrade its industry, it must 
defy its comparative advantage (which is to engage in production or manufacturing that is 
not defined by its comparative advantage), resulting in medium term adjustment and 
long-term development (Lin & Chang, 2009). Chang also encourages the protection of 
these industries as they develop as part of making them competitive on the international 
market (Lin & Chang, 2009). He states that this may be a lengthy process to economic 
growth and development, and there must be an accumulation of the right capital, as well 
as a retraining of the labour force from traditional industries, but returns will be high (Lin 
& Chang, 2009). In order to illustrate the benefits of defying comparative advantage, 
Chang uses the example of Japan which, in defying comparative advantage, developed a 
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car industry that, today, is a global contender, and did so through four decades of 
protecting the industry with tariffs and subsidies, as well as banning foreign direct 
investment (Lin & Chang, 2009). 
Looking at how developed countries such as Japan have developed some of their 
industries, history shows that there has been a deviation from comparative advantage, 
accompanied by the protection and subsidisation of these industries. For developing 
countries, not defying their comparative advantage may mean that they will continue to 
invest in labour and resource-intensive production activities and services that may not see 
industrial advancement and development. In agreeing with Chang (Lin & Chang, 2009), it 
is necessary for these countries to defy their comparative advantage, set up and protect 
higher-tech industries in order to see long-term development while foregoing short-term 
returns. 
 This section has highlighted many of the tensions that exist in today’s current food 
system, directly or indirectly, with particular focus on debates surrounding the 
international market, private sector and state involvement. We must, however, now turn 
to how it is that these issues apply to a developing country that has decided to pursue food 
self-sufficiency as opposed to depending on the international market for food, and in a 
way that follows, in theory, the logic of the post-Washington consensus through a smart 
subsidy programme: Malawi. 
 
Food Self-Sufficiency and Subsidies in Malawi 
Since its independence in 1964, Malawi has pursued food self-sufficiency as a 
national priority, achieving it at different periods after independence, but most recently 
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since the implementation of FISP in 2005/06. There, however, continues to be debate 
surrounding food self-sufficiency in the country, and whether or not it is a goal that 
should be pursued. 
Regarding maize self-sufficiency in Sub Saharan African countries, Jayne and 
Rukuni (1993) highlight the benefits of maize self-sufficiency as the global market for 
white maize (which is the type of maize mostly grown in Southern Africa) is thin and “the 
producer price needed for self-sufficiency can normally be achieved at price levels below 
import parity” (p. 334). Kelly et. al (2003) note that, due to Malawi’s landlocked location, 
weak markets and poor infrastructure, national food self-sufficiency is a more attractive 
policy option than it would be in countries where infrastructure is more developed and 
markets are efficient. Moreover, Denning et. al (2009) state that, in Malawi, achieving 
national food self-sufficiency is cheaper than importing food, which can be seen from an 
analysis of different national food security scenarios including and excluding FISP, which 
“suggests that, in the last [six] years, [the programme] may have led to average annual 
savings of maize imports of some 385,000MT, directly offsetting up to between 85 and 
110 [percent] of programme costs” (Dorward et. al, 2013, p. iii). Kelly et. al, however, 
raise concerns about the ability of a policy of maize self-sufficiency to address poor 
access to food in Malawi as it does not promote the growth of income-generating crops 
by smallholder farmers, which could ultimately alleviate their poverty in the long run 
(2003, p. 396). 
Given Malawi’s geographical location as well as its poor infrastructure, national 
food self-sufficiency is a more feasible policy to pursue as opposed to largely depending 
on the global market for food. While food self-sufficiency does not mean that there will 
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be no purchase of food on the international market, it is imperative for Malawi to be able 
to grow enough food to feed its population, rather than depending on purchasing food on 
the international market, which would be a more expensive option. The thin global 
market for maize, Malawi’s staple food, highlighted by Jayne and Rukuni (1993), also 
makes it more practical for the country to pursue national maize self-sufficiency rather 
than depending on limited global markets to import its staple food. The ability of national 
food self-sufficiency to benefit the poor and weak in a country, mentioned by Chandra 
and Lontoh (2010) in the previous section, is particularly important in Malawi, given the 
number of poor smallholder farmers who may benefit from being able to grow their own 
food for consumption and selling the surplus for income, provided that they have the 
means to do so. Whether policies and programmes geared towards national food self-
sufficiency can actually alleviate the poverty of smallholder farmers, a concern raised by 
Kelly et. al (2003), largely depends on the nature of these programmes, who they target 
and how they are carried out.  
 
Smart Subsidies 
As the nature of subsidy programmes being implemented in SSA has evolved over 
the years, the 21st century has seen the rise of the smart subsidy, with countries such as 
Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Rwanda implementing smart subsidy programmes 
(Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). The idea of the smart subsidy arises from the 
proposition that subsidies are neither inherently flawed nor inherently useful, but rather 
their effectiveness is dependent on their design and implementation (Morduch, 2005). 
Various definitions of smart subsidies have been put forward, with most of them 
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containing similar features, but emphasising different aspects of the smart subsidy. This 
following section examines these different definitions and features of smart subsidies, 
exploring the debates regarding their benefits and limitations. This serves as a backdrop 
to the upcoming evaluation of Malawi’s FISP, and will facilitate discussion both on FISP, 
and on smart subsidies in general.  
 
Smart Subsidies Defined 
Howell (2005) defines smart subsidies as those applied on services and products 
from which only the poor are most likely to benefit. Some definitions, however, have 
expanded on this definition, highlighting how smart subsidies should serve the poor but 
also promote the growth of the market and the private sector. Minot and Benson (2009) 
define smart subsidies as those that provide subsidised goods and services in such a way 
that promotes market development and improves the welfare of the poor. In their 
definition of smart subsidies, Morris et. al (2007) abandon the emphasis on the poor and 
highlight the temporary nature of smart subsidies, defining them as interventions of a 
temporary nature that work alone or in combination with other interventions to lower 
fertiliser prices and improve availability at the farm level such that fertiliser is used 
efficiently and investment in fertiliser markets by the private sector is encouraged. Taking 
the definition provided by Morris et. al (2007), and also including the need for smart 
subsidies to benefit the poor, provides a definition of smart subsidies that encompasses 
the different definitions provided in the literature. 
When identifying the features of a smart subsidy in detail, different authors 
highlight different characteristics that a smart-subsidy should have. Morris et. al (2007) 
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highlight 10 guiding principles that make subsidies “smart”. The first guiding principle is 
that smart subsidies must promote the use of fertiliser as part of a broader strategy that 
also includes features such as strengthening output markets and supplying complementary 
inputs as the provision of fertilisers alone will not promote increased fertiliser use if other 
complementary inputs, such as seeds, are not available or accessible, or farmers do not 
have access to markets to sell their produce. Smart subsidies must also support “market-
based solutions” through developing markets and avoiding eroding incentives for private 
sector investment and, in order to ensure service at its lowest cost and best quality, they 
should promote competition in fertiliser distribution. They should also adhere to farmers’ 
demands for fertiliser while at the same time only encouraging increased fertiliser use 
where fertiliser use is economically efficient. Smart subsidies should empower farmers to 
decide on the most appropriate route to take in soil fertility management in their specific 
farming context. The subsidies should be environmentally, economically and 
institutionally sustainable and there should also be regional harmonization and integration 
of fertiliser policies in order to gain from economies of size and scope.  
Morris et. al (2007) also state that smart subsidies should have an exit strategy in 
order for governments not to involve themselves in fertiliser distribution for the long 
term. This is because subsidies, according to Morris et. al (2007), are not a long-term 
solution to missing fertiliser markets, but are a fiscal burden that draws government funds 
away from investments in infrastructure, research, and extension that is needed in order to 
develop fertiliser markets that are efficient. A final feature is that, assuming that the 
above features are in effect in the subsidy programme, smart subsidies should promote 
pro-poor growth, which may be prioritised over efficiency and sustainability if it is 
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deemed that fertiliser subsidies are a cost-effective way of confronting poverty (Morris et. 
al, 2007, pp. 103-5). 
While Minde and Ndlovu agree with Morris et al (2007) that smart subsidies 
should have an exit strategy, they also emphasize that smart subsidies should target 
farmers who, otherwise, would not use agricultural inputs or, alternatively, areas where 
increased fertiliser use would have the greatest impact (Druilhe & Barreiro- Hurlé, 2012). 
Minde and Ndlovu also state that smart subsidies should involve achievable goals, 
measurable impacts and results orientation (as cited in Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). 
Baltzer and Hansen (2011) provide three main characteristics of smart subsidies, 
which they state serve as a summary of the different characteristics of smart subsidies put 
forward in the literature. In identifying the characteristics of smart subsidies, similar to 
Minde and Ndlovu (as cited in Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012), Baltzer and Hansen 
(2011) state that smart subsidies should target farmers who are not already using 
agricultural inputs, as well as targeting those households that are the poorest and most 
vulnerable as this will reduce the chances of the displacement of commercial, non-
subsidised input sales and promote pro-poor growth. They also state that smart subsidy 
programmes should support the development of the private sector as opposed to 
displacing it with state-controlled distribution systems as this will serve to enhance the 
efficiency of input delivery and increase the chances of the subsidy programme having a 
sustained impact post-termination (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). This characteristic is aligned 
with the market-based solutions that Morris et. al (2007) state as a principle of smart 
subsidies. Baltzer and Hansen (2011) also agree with Morris et. al (2007) and Minde and 
Ndlovu (as cited in Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012) that smart subsidies should have an 
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exit strategy due to the high costs and growing unaffordability of the programmes and 
their increasing proneness to political manipulation, thus decreasing efficiency. These 
three main characteristics are ones that other authors such as Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé 
(2012), Minde et. al (2008) and Tiba (2011) agree with as central to a smart subsidy. 
Given that these characteristics are seen by many authors as central to smart subsidies, 
and also encompass most of the characteristics provided by Morris et. al (2007), they 
shall be the main focus in the evaluation of FISP in this thesis. 
Drawing from the main smart-subsidy characteristics put forward, Baltzer and 
Hansen (2011) suggest that smart subsidies are “based on the economic principles of 
efficiency, equity and sustainability” (p. 3). Input subsidies are considered to be 
inefficient if the low use of agricultural inputs they seek to address is due to notably high 
costs of agricultural input delivery, or if the benefits of increased production are too low 
for agricultural inputs to be an investment that is profitable. Baltzer and Hansen (2011) 
argue that, in this case, government funds should be directed at policies that will lower 
transaction costs, such as infrastructure and market deregulation. Agricultural input 
subsidies are, however, efficient if farmers are prevented from realising the economic 
potential of using agricultural inputs due to market failures such as credit constraints and 
imperfect competition in supply leading to higher input prices (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). 
Regarding the principle of equity, Baltzer and Hansen (2011) state that smart 
subsidies can promote equality through specifically targeting the poorest smallholders, 
but poor farmers may face the greatest constraints of market failures such as credit 
constraints, and may lack complementary resources such as skill or the money to pay the 
subsidised prices. As a result, this may lead to a trade-off between efficiency and equity 
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objectives, depending on the primary aims of the particular programme (Baltzer & 
Hansen, 2011). 
Baltzer and Hansen note that input subsidies can be considered sustainable if they 
can undergo long-term implementation without draining public resources, or “if the 
outcomes in terms of wider adoption of agricultural inputs and improved agricultural 
productivity persist after their termination” (2011, p. 6). In the event that they meet 
efficiency and equity objectives, long-term input subsidies can be justified (Baltzer & 
Hansen, 2011). As a result of political manipulation that has been noted in some input 
subsidy programmes, however, there are concerns that if a subsidy programme is long-
term, it grows more inefficient and less equitable with time, leading to its unsustainability 
(Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). Smart-subsidies, therefore, counter these effects through 
having an exit strategy (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011).  
With an understanding of how it is that smart subsidies are defined, their 
characteristics, and the principles upon which they are based, this thesis now turns to the 
debates surrounding the three characteristics of smart subsidies highlighted by Baltzer 
and Hansen (2011), and how these debates may apply to Malawi’s FISP. 
 
Targeting 
Through targeting, smart subsidies aim to address the challenges that arose from 
universal subsidies in SSA in the 1970s and 1980s. Baltzer and Hansen (2011) note that, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, universal subsidies implemented in SSA were able to raise the 
use of agricultural inputs by farmers and increase agricultural productivity. There were, 
however, also inefficiencies within these programmes, with better-off farmers benefitting 
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more than poorer farmers, commercial sales of inputs being displaced, and the costs of the 
programme exceeding the benefits (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011; Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 
2012). Baltzer and Hansen (2011) note that targeted subsidies stimulate pro-poor growth 
and lessen the possibility of the replacement of non-subsidised commercial input sales. 
Tiba (2011) also notes the benefits of subsidies that are targeted at the poor, stating that, 
“poorer farms are thought to be generally more productive in cultivating labour-intensive 
staple food crops” (p. 516). Wiggins and Brooks (2010), however, highlight that targeting 
may be a challenging task, and politically and socially divisive if the criterion for access 
is unclear (p. 18). Moreover, there may also be political pressure to make subsidies 
universal (Wiggins & Brooks, 2010, p. 18). Gilens (2009) highlights this with the 
example of universal social programmes, which tend to receive strong public support as 
middle-class self-interest dictates the willingness of better-off citizens to be taxed for 
programmes in which they will directly benefit, as opposed to those which are directed 
only towards the poor. In line with concerns over targeting and the unclear criterion for 
access, Tiba (2011) claims that smart subsidies run the risk of leakage to farmers who are 
better off and proposes self-targeting, which connects public works programmes with 
input distribution, as a solution to this as farmers who are better off are less likely to take 
part in these public works programmes.  
Drawing from these different arguments, it is in the interest of a country with 
limited resources and a large population of poor smallholder farmers such as Malawi to 
implement targeted input subsidies so that less public resources can be spent on 
subsidising farmers, or poor farmers can get greater subsidies, without having to subsidise 
farmers who, on their own, can purchase their own fertiliser. It is imperative, however, to 
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look back at the argument put forward by Chang (2008) over the need for governments in 
developing countries to support and protect their industries in order for development. In 
the event that governments can afford to provide subsidies to more of their farmers, and 
not just those considered to be the poorest, this should be pursued provided that it is 
affordable and economically sustainable, as well as providing benefits that exceed the 
costs of the programme. This would then go beyond trying to alleviate poverty to growing 
domestic industries through support and protection. The politically and socially divisive 
nature of targeted subsidies in the absence of a clear criterion of eligibility highlighted by 
Wiggins and Brooks (2010) cannot be ignored but, even with a clear criterion for 
eligibility, the way in which the subsidies are redistributed may still see certain groups of 
people being overlooked in practice as traditional authorities and politicians may 
distribute coupons as they see fit, rather than adhering to the given criteria. This can be 
seen in Zambia, whereby the Farm Support Programme (FSP) is designed to subsidise 
farmers with more than one hectare of land but less than five hectares but, in practice, it is 
farmers with land between one and 20 hectares who are subsidised, with those with more 
land receiving a disproportionately greater amount of inputs from the subsidy (Druilhe & 
Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012).  
 
Private Sector Development 
Smart subsidies emphasize the participation of the private sector in different 
aspects of the programme, placing particular emphasis on the retail of subsidised 
fertilisers (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011; Morris et. al, 2007). Support for the promotion of the 
private sector is based on it being seen as more efficient than the state, making it 
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necessary for a country’s economic development. Hipsher (2013) agrees with this notion, 
using the example of China, a country that has seen substantial poverty reduction and 
economic growth, and where private enterprises have proved to be more productive in 
resource use and more efficient in their use of capital than state-owned firms. 
Chirwa and Dorward (2013c) state that the inclusion of the private sector in large-
scale agricultural input subsidy programmes has benefits given that the private sector is 
more efficient than the public sector, being less prone to issues of bureaucracy that are 
often concomitant with state delivery of services. Other benefits of private sector 
involvement in input subsidy programmes include the encouragement of private market 
system development in remote areas where there is otherwise little incentive for this 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). Chirwa and Dorward also note that, particularly when the 
private sector is involved in the retail of subsidised inputs, this “reduces the displacement 
of commercial sales by subsidised inputs” (2013c, p. 3).   
Private sector participation, however, can be controlled by the government as a 
tool of patronage. Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) note that this has been the case in 
Senegal and Mali’s input subsidy programmes whereby, in input supply, the programmes 
have only benefitted a few importing companies that were closely affiliated with the 
governments.  Private sector participation in subsidy programmes may also be limited due 
to fears of corruption and limited transparency. In Malawi, while private sector 
participation may be encouraged in certain activities surrounding fertiliser subsidies such 
as procurement, there is less support coming from the government for its participation in 
subsidy fertiliser distribution because of the perception that the private sector cannot be 
trusted and may partake in fraudulent activities which may not be detected by the 
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government due to the absence of an audit system and failure to verify available stocks, 
making the costs of the programme difficult to control (Chirwa and Dorward, 2013c).  
The participation of the private sector in some capacity in FISP is important in 
order to stimulate the growth of the private sector, which may also lead to the growth of 
the economy. This, however, is not to say that the private sector is good and SOEs are 
bad. As Chang (2008) states, inefficiency is not inherent in SOEs and, unless there are 
particular instances of inefficiency within an SOE, the capabilities of these enterprises 
should not be dismissed. In line with Chang’s claim that “competition is often the best 
way to improve enterprise performance” (2008, p. 120), private sector participation in 
fertiliser distribution may help to improve the performance of parastatals in service 
delivery in fertiliser distribution. In order to promote the growth of the private sector and 
improve economic growth in Malawi, the private sector should not be excluded from 
participating in subsidised fertiliser retail for FISP, but there is need for measures to be 
put in place in order to combat or prevent corrupt practices within all retailers, public and 
private, in order to address concerns that the Malawian government may have. The claims 
made by Chirwa and Dorward (2013c) regarding the ability of private sector participation 
in fertiliser distribution to reduce displacement have some merit because the private 
sector will benefit from increased subsidised fertiliser sales and, in the case of Malawi, 
participating retailers, none of who are private, have also experienced increases in their 
sales of unsubsidised fertilisers because of the demand pull that has been created by the 
subsidies (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). Displacement of commercial sales by input 
subsidies may, however, also be indicative of greater inefficiencies that go beyond private 
sector involvement, such as poor targeting, which may lead to better-off farmers who 
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    70 
 
were purchasing commercial fertilisers ceasing to do so if they become beneficiaries of 
the subsidy programme.  
Although Chirwa and Dorward (2013c) see private sector participation in FISP as 
having the potential to encourage the development of private market systems in remote 
areas, there will most likely need to be greater incentives such as infrastructural 
development, and demand for other goods and services in order to see this development 
in remote areas. While private sector participation in subsidies and its subsequent 
development may contribute to the efficiency of a subsidy programme through 
encouraging competition, as well as promote economic growth, the potential for political 
manipulation and patronage which may limit private sector participation, as in the case of 
Senegal and Mali highlighted by Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012), must not be 
overlooked as a significant challenge to private sector participation. 
In the promotion of private sector development, the use of vouchers, or coupons, 
in smart subsidies is encouraged as it can create additional demand for inputs from 
farmers who are not already purchasing agricultural inputs for use because of lack of 
purchasing power or a substantial perceived risk in the use of fertiliser (Gregory, 2006). 
Minot and Benson note that vouchers serve as a way to guarantee agricultural input 
demand and a profit margin for input retailers, which has the potential to enable them to 
“capture economies of scale in their business, reducing some of their risk, and 
contributing to setting their business on a sound financial footing” (2009, p. 4). Gregory 
(2006) notes, however, that if vouchers are not recipient specific, this may lead to the 
development of a secondary market and cause leakage from the intended beneficiaries. 
Minot and Benson (2009) state that vouchers have high administrative costs and only 
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benefit those who live close enough to trade them in, and their effectiveness in terms of 
stimulating private sector input markets is limited if they can only be redeemed at 
government suppliers or select private dealers. In making this latter argument, they 
highlight Malawi’s FISP, which is the largest voucher programme in SSA, as an example, 
whereby half of the country’s fertiliser market is made up of subsidised fertiliser and the 
share of private input distributors has fallen to 58 percent (Minot and Benson, 2009). 
Minot and Benson state that, “the theoretical virtues of input vouchers as a smart subsidy 
to strengthen private input supply networks are thus negated by the way [FISP] is 
implemented” (2009, p. 6). More on this shall be explored in Chapter Four.  
Although the use of vouchers may have the potential to stimulate the growth of 
the private sector, as highlighted by Gregory (2006) and Minot and Benson (2009), 
Gregory (2006) makes a strong point in stating that, without recipient specific vouchers, 
the formation of a secondary market and leakage is likely. Vouchers, however, as stated 
by Minot and Benson (2009), have high administrative costs, and the adoption of 
recipient specific vouchers may lead to greater increases in administrative costs as it may 
involve printing each beneficiary household name on the voucher. The limits in the 
stimulation of private sector growth by vouchers because of limited private sector 
participation in subsidised fertiliser retail is a significant challenge, and highlights the 
disconnection between the design and implementation of smart subsidy programmes. 
Vouchers have their benefits in private sector development, but poor targeting and limited 
private sector participation in distribution must be addressed in order for these benefits to 
be realised.    
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Exit Strategies 
The need for exit strategies from subsidy programmes arises from concerns of 
growing inefficiency and cost over time. In SSA, only two input subsidy programmes 
have an exit strategy: Zambia’s FSP and Tanzania’s National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS). Chirwa and Dorward note that there has been difficulty in 
implementing the exit strategies, possibly due to “an apparent and indeed remarkable lack 
of attention to the question of why and how scaling back, graduation, and exit should and 
could occur” (2013a, p. 60). Zambia’s FSP, which was implemented in 2002, was 
supposed to be temporary and last for only three years, with beneficiary farmers 
graduating from the programme within that time, and able to purchase non-subsidised 
fertiliser, but the programme is still ongoing (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011; Druilhe & 
Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). The implementation of the graduation mechanism was the 
responsibility of farmer cooperatives, but a study shows that only 5 percent of them took 
previous support from FSP into account when selecting beneficiaries thus affecting 
possibilities of graduation (Baltzer & Hansen, 2011). In the case of Tanzania, NAIVS was 
supposed to last for three years, with recipients receiving support for that amount of time, 
but with new entrants coming in every year for the first three years of the programme, 
implementation time was extended to five years, and an exit strategy is yet to be redefined 
(Baltzer & Hansen, 2011; Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). There are, however, concerns 
that awareness of an exit strategy amongst beneficiary farmers is low, with some 
believing that they were to receive vouchers every year in continuation, which may be 
problematic in preparing them to purchase agricultural inputs on their own should the 
programme be terminated (Malhotra, 2013). 
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 Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé argue that, although subsidies may be beneficial in 
the short-term, they are financially unsustainable in the long run (2012, p. i). Wiggins and 
Brooks (2010) agree with Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) regarding the growing 
inefficiency of input subsidies with time, arguing that they consume an increasing amount 
of funds designated to public goods, which may be detrimental to development and 
growth. Wiggins and Brooks (2010) provide the example of India as a case where, 
between 1980 and 2000, there was less spending on public goods as the spending on 
subsidies increased, but the compromise of other development objectives such as 
education and health due to high budgetary costs of subsidies is suggested as a possibility 
rather than stated as a reality. Chirwa, Dorward and Matita (2012) note that, in the case of 
Malawi, some in support of an exit strategy from FISP argue that the programme may not 
be the best use of limited public resources, especially in the face of other national 
development needs.  
 Based on past input subsidy programmes which grew increasingly inefficient with 
time, such as India’s input subsidies during the Green Revolution, Dorward et. al argue 
that, although input subsidies become more inefficient with time, this should not nullify 
their initial positive effects on agricultural growth (as cited in Dorward, 2009). Druilhe 
and Barreiro-Hurlé note that there are no empirical studies that have yet confirmed that 
exit strategies guarantee an increase in fertiliser use post-subsidy (2012, p. 35). Exits from 
subsidies are based on farmers having gained adequate knowledge of and experience in 
the use of agricultural inputs and their benefits and the development of private sector 
input supplies (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a; Morris et. al as cited in Druilhe and Barreiro-
Hurlé, 2012). Chirwa and Dorward (2013a), however, criticize this approach, stating that, 
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“there is little explicit consideration of other processes by which access to subsidies may 
lead to recipient households no longer needing them” (p. 267). 
As noted by Dorward et. al (as cited in Dorward, 2009), while there may be some 
inefficiencies and irregularities in the implementation of FISP in Malawi, the positive 
results of the programme in terms of contributing to the increase in national maize 
production and productivity, and leading to national maize self-sufficiency, cannot be 
ignored. Irregularities in the programme should be seen more as problems arising from 
FISP’s implementation rather than the inefficiency of subsidies themselves. Concerns 
over the financial unsustainability of input subsidies (Druille & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012) 
and, more specifically, the financial unviability of FISP (Chirwa et. al, 2013) cannot, 
however, be ignored, especially in the case of Malawi, a country with many 
developmental needs and limited government funds, and there may be need for better 
implementation of the programme to better control costs.  
With the conditions for exit being focused on private sector development and 
better farmer knowledge and experience of input use, the need to consider other processes 
which may result in farmers no longer needing subsidies, put forward by Chirwa and 
Dorward (2013a), is important as exit strategies may be implemented at a time when there 
are still farmers highly dependent on input subsidies. Moreover the failure of Zambia and 
Tanzania to implement their exit strategies which are based on farmer graduation as 
opposed to private sector development, must be noted as it emphasizes that there is still a 
need for better justification and planning of exit strategies in order to determine their 
feasibility.  
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There is a double standard that seems to exist when comparing subsidies in 
developing countries with those in developed countries. The reasoning behind the need 
for an exit strategy due to growing inefficiency and the costly nature of subsidies, along 
with other criticism of subsidies, such as interference with the market which may affect 
economic growth, applies only to developing countries, and yet in the Global North, some 
countries’ farmers are highly subsidised, with no exit strategy in sight, and this has 
contributed to the development of their agricultural sectors. The USA subsidises its 
wealthy farmers with no exit strategy, justifying its cotton subsidies, for example, as ones 
with no direct link to production, and with no distortionary effect on the market (Rosset, 
2006). As stated earlier, however, these cotton subsidies place the USA at an advantage 
over other countries in agricultural trade, as the USA has a high market share of these 
subsidised products and keeps the prices low (Rosset, 2006). 
As is highlighted by Chang (2008), the developed countries, the ones which have 
experienced the economic growth which is deemed to be exemplary for developing 
countries, have done so with the use of subsidies and other government intervention, not 
through abiding by neoliberal ideals, yet there is an expectation that developing countries 
should develop by getting rid of the very policies that have assisted developed countries 
in their economic growth. This double standard affects developing countries, but there are 
limits to these double standards being addressed by international institutions, as can be 
seen in the cotton dispute between the USA and Brazil, where a country’s silence can be 
bought.  
The general consensus from the current literature on smart subsidies in agriculture 
is that they are appealing in theory, but their implementation continues to fall short. There 
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is strong evidence that suggests that smart subsidies have shown effectiveness – limited 
as it may be – in raising fertilizer use, increasing production and average yields, but their 
success largely depends on their implementation (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012; Minde 
et. al, 2008). I, however, must dispute the appealing nature of smart subsidies.  
Although smart subsidies advocate for targeting poor smallholder farmers, the 
model makes no mention of the uneven playing field on which farmers in developing 
countries must compete with subsidised farmers from wealthier countries. While the 
poorest farmers may be subsidised under the smart subsidy model, farmers who are not 
guaranteed government support in the form of subsidies and must still compete at a 
disadvantage. This also applies to the need for an exit strategy, which leaves farmers 
without government support, and so may find farmers participating in a place of greater 
disadvantage on the international market once the programme has been terminated. The 
smart subsidy model, therefore, fails to confront existing terms of production and trade on 
a global scale that have largely disadvantaged smallholder farmers.  
Another concern is that smart subsidies fail to adequately address issues 
pertaining to environmental sustainability. Although, as stated earlier, smart subsidies 
should be environmentally sustainable, there is no specification as to how this should be 
achieved. Moreover, the expectation that farmers should choose the most appropriate 
route in soil fertility management may contradict with the aim for environmental 
sustainability in the event that farmers choose a method of soil fertility management that 
is not environmentally sustainable, and reflects the ‘local trap’ in the smart subsidy 
model. The discussion put forward by Baltzer and Hansen (2012) on smart subsidies 
being based on the principle of sustainability focuses on economic sustainability, making 
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no mention of environmental sustainability. This is particularly important given the 
challenges of environmental degradation being faced by SSA, and also because the smart 
subsidy programmes currently in place all depend heavily on chemical fertilisers, which 
may not necessarily be beneficial in all circumstances.  
Closely related to the dependence on chemical fertilisers is that on imported 
chemical fertilisers. Although the smart subsidy model encourages market-based 
solutions and private sector development, there is no consideration given to the 
development of domestic fertiliser manufacturing, which is an important issue given how 
countries such as Malawi are highly dependent on imported chemical fertilisers for their 
subsidy programmes, which contributes significantly to programme costs, not only 
because of importation and transportation costs, but also because the countries are not 
shielded from price surges on the international market as was the case in 2008 when 
fertiliser prices peaked, significantly increasing costs for subsidy programmes, as shall be 
shown in FISP in Chapter Four.  
Concerns with an exit strategy in the model have already been discussed above, 
and will not be repeated, but this brings into question the appealing nature of the smart-
subsidy model and highlights the need to revisit it in order for it to address issues of 
environmental sustainability, dependence and long-term development.  
From the arguments surrounding smart subsidies presented above, it can be 
deduced that, while the characteristics of smart subsidies may have their benefits, they 
also have their limitations, especially when it comes to addressing long-term development 
and confronting import dependence and environmental degradation. The realisation of 
some of the proposed benefits of smart subsidies have yet to be seen as the smart 
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subsidies currently being implemented have not been implemented according to how they 
have been designed due to obstacles such as political interference and ambiguous design.  
In the next chapter, Malawi’s FISP shall be explored, with particular attention 
being paid to the main characteristics of smart subsidies; targeting, private sector 
development and exit strategies. The debates that have been presented and discussed 
above shall serve as the framework for FISP’s analysis, and will be revisited in assessing 
the implementation of smart subsidies in the SSA context.  
Given that political interference presents itself as a notable challenge in the 
successful implementation of smart subsidies, as has been seen in Chapter Two and shall 
be explored at greater lengths in Chapter Four with regards to Malawi, it is imperative to 
turn to a brief discussion on patronage and corruption and their impacts on development 
in order to better understand the complexity and possibilities, if any, of confronting the 
use of programmes such as FISP as a source of patronage.  
 
Patronage, Corruption and Development 
 Although patronage can be found in various forms in different countries, both 
developed and developing, it is seen and portrayed by some as inherent in politics in 
Africa. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, the use of patronage in modern politics 
can be traced back to the colonial period, as well as in the transition of power from 
colonial powers to Africans. Patronage is considered as a form of corruption, which has 
been criticised for its negative effects on the development process at economic, 
administrative, political and social levels because of the use of public funds for personal 
gain (Hope Sr & Chikulo, 2000; Szeftel, 1998).  
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In discussing neopatrimonialism, of which patronage is a feature, Tim Kelsall describes 
how it is that the distribution of resources in exchange for political support has been 
possible in African countries. Kelsall (2011) states that, in countries that have weak 
public services and finances, credible commitments to programmatic investments are 
difficult for politicians to make. Given that large sects of the populations have limited 
access to information, as well as limited formal education, it is more difficult for them to 
appreciate such commitments and promises in the form of concrete donations such as 
private goods, jobs or the building of a school are more appealing (Kelsall, 2011). Kelsall 
also notes that weak markets allow politicians easy access to wealth, and that the business 
sector also serves as a “valuable source of rents for politicians to distribute in the interests 
of buying off political rivals, or winning election contests” (2011, p. 3). 
As efforts have been made to address different forms of corruption in developing 
countries, the state has often been portrayed as the problem, and democratization and 
liberalisation have been framed as the solutions, accompanied with calls for greater 
accountability, transparency, and more effective monitoring (Szeftel, 1998). This, 
however, has been contested by some members of the academe, who see liberalisation as 
part of the problem rather than the solution. Szeftel (1998) argues that economic and 
political reforms imposed in Africa under structural adjustment have been disruptive and 
encouraged corruption in the countries. Szeftel (1998) provides the example of the scaling 
back of the state, stating that structural adjustment and liberalisation have removed its 
oversight capabilities. He also states that rapid privatisation has created opportunities for 
personal accumulation through allowing politicians to purchase assets at notably cheap 
prices as they are privatised before others have an opportunity to do so because have 
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access to information about these conversions prior to the public (Szeftel, 1998). In 
discussing how patronage has limited the effectiveness of community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) in Tanzania, Nelson and Agrawal (2008) note that, 
since neoliberal reforms were implemented, there has been greater involvement of public 
officials using their positions as a means to pursue private accumulative interests.  
Patronage in development projects and programmes can limit their effectiveness. 
This can be seen Tanzania, where wildlife stands as a valuable patronage resource given 
the growth of the tourist hunting sector. As a result of the importance of wildlife, which is 
often found on communal lands, reforms for local level decision making regarding the 
lands are only paper, but the central actors continue to monopolize resource allocation 
with neopatrimonial motivations (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). Nelson and Agrawal note 
how patronage, in this instance, has been fought through donors and international 
conservation groups who have financial resources valuable to state authorities putting 
pressure on them in order to see reforms, but this pressure has been largely ineffective as 
donors have little leverage in ensuring lasting change (2008). 
Pressure from donors is one method that has been used in an effort to reduce 
patronage and corruption. Lawal (2007) suggests the need for increased transparency and 
accountability, strengthened institutions, and enhanced public participation in decision-
making. Lawal also states that free and open competition, be it bureaucratic, economic or 
political, is the best weapon against corruption (2007). Szeftel (1998), who finds 
liberalisation as part of the problem when it comes to corruption, emphasises the need to 
strengthen the state rather than focus on making it smaller in order for effective 
combating of corruption. 
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 Malawi can be said to have, in some form, the characteristics described by Kelsall 
(2011) that have made it easier for patronage to take root. With a high poverty rate, food 
insecurity, and large dependence on agriculture for livelihoods, subsidy programmes have 
presented themselves as viable sources for patronage, being used in electoral campaigns 
in order to appeal to people’s more immediate needs in exchange for their votes.  
Combating patronage and corruption is a challenge. Calls for increased 
liberalisation and less state involvement must take into account how this may reduce the 
government’s capabilities to monitor the operations of private institutions, which are not 
immune to corruption. Moreover, privatisation, as Nelson and Agrawal (2008) and Szeftel 
(1998), can also be taken advantage of by public officials as opportunities to benefit over 
the rest of the populace, and gain sources of patronage. Increased government 
transparency and accountability, as put forward by Lawal (2007) may be beneficial in 
allowing the population to see how it is that public resources are being handled, but this 
will require a well-informed and active civil society. 
 Having briefly examined literature on patronage and development, we will now 
proceed to analyse and evaluate empirical data on Malawi’s FISP. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MALAWI’S FISP 
The last two chapters have provided background information on Malawi’s 
agriculture and agricultural input subsidy programmes, as well as discussion on the 
central debates surrounding national self-sufficiency, agricultural subsidies, the role of the 
private sector and the state and smart subsidies, particularly in the Malawian context. 
Drawing on the debates put forward in the last chapter, this chapter presents, discusses 
and analyses empirical research on FISP in order to show how the programme has not 
been successfully implemented as a smart subsidy.  
This chapter shall begin by discussing and analysing data on Malawi’s maize 
production and productivity, as well as providing brief discussion on income and wage 
changes, and then will pay particular attention to the programme’s targeting, private 
sector involvement, and need, or lack thereof, of an exit strategy, which are the three 
main characteristics of a smart subsidy. 
 
Malawi’s Maize Production and Productivity 
In order to present the changes that have arisen in maize production since the 
implementation of FISP, Figure 3.1 shows Malawi’s total maize production between 1996 
and 2013. 
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Figure 3.1. Total maize production in Malawi, 1996 to 2013. Reprinted from FAOSTAT (2015) 
 
Prior to FISP’s implementation in 2005/06, Malawi’s maize production never went 
beyond 2,510,000 tonnes. In 2006, maize production shot up to 2,611,486 tonnes, 
increasing again the following year and, with the exception of 2008, staying well above 
3,000,000 tonnes between 2007 and 2012, a quantity that had not been reached prior to 
the implementation of FISP.  
Between 2000/01 and 2011/12, the increase in the amount of land under maize production 
was marginal, suggesting that increases in production were due to increases in yield, as 
the average maize yield rose from an average of 1.3 metric tonnes per hectare to an 
average of 2.7 metric tonnes per hectare (Pauw & Thurlow, 2014, p. 1). Between the time 
that FISP was first implemented and 2010, Malawi saw a 24 percent change in its maize 
yields, which increased to 1,853kg/ha, while other East African countries that did not 
have agricultural subsidy programmes in place only saw a 4 percent increase in their 
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yield increases brought about during FISP to maize yield changes in other SSA countries 
that have implemented fertiliser subsidies, Malawi’s yield increases are not disappointing, 
but could be better, with Tanzania and Kenya reporting a decline in their maize yields 
since the implementation of their subsidy programmes, while Zambia has seen a 30 
percent increase to 2,005kg/ha and Rwanda has also seen a 30 percent increase to 
1,203kg/ha (Druilhe & Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). 
From Figure 3.1 and the data on yields above, it can be deduced that FISP has 
contributed quite significantly to Malawi’s considerable increase in maize production and 
maize productivity. FISP, however, must not be seen as solely responsible for the 
increases as weather patterns have also been favourable since its implementation, with no 
major droughts both for the country and the Southern African region, even while they 
typically occur every few years (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). 
The increase in maize production has also resulted in Malawi achieving maize 
self-sufficiency. Figure 3.2 shows Malawi’s level of maize self-sufficiency, which is 
calculated by subtracting maize exports from maize production, and then comparing the 
amount of available maize to the national food requirement. Given that the national food 
requirement changes over the years, two estimates have been used for the national food 
requirement as pertains to maize: 2.5 million tonnes in 2007/08 (AfDB & OECD, 2008), 
and 2,461,054 metric tonnes in 2013 (MVAC, 2013). In the years when the amount of 
available maize exceeded the national food requirement, maize self-sufficiency could be 
considered achieved. Using these two national food requirements for all of the years 
under review, with the exception of the year 2000, Malawi’s domestic maize production 
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after exports has remained above the food requirement since 2006, and so Malawi has 
been self-sufficient in maize since the implementation of FISP.  
  
 
Figure 3.2. Maize self-sufficiency in Malawi, 2000 to 2012. Adapted from AfDB and OECD 
(2008), FAOSTAT (2015), and MVAC (2013). 
 
Despite its food self-sufficiency, reports of millions of people requiring food 
assistance in Malawi have continued, with 1.97 million people unable to access adequate 
food to meet their basic needs in October 2012, and 1.8 million people requiring food 
assistance in November 2013 (ReliefWeb, 2015; WFP, 2014). Poor targeting, which shall 
be explored in the next section, means that those who are poor and are not recipients of 
FISP, still have to purchase maize and, if they are unable to afford it, they may still find 
themselves in a state of food insecurity because of poor access, despite availability. Late 
delivery of inputs also means that planting is done late, which often worsens the quality 
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well how achieving national food self-sufficiency does not always translate to achieving 
food self-sufficiency at the household level, and reflects the uneven distribution of food in 
the country. 
 
It is important to note that FISP’s contributions to increased production and 
productivity have been through the use of chemical fertilisers. While Morris et. al (2007) 
emphasize the need for smart subsidies to empower farmers to decide on the most 
appropriate route to take when it comes to soil fertility management, FISP promotes the 
use of chemical fertilisers, and the seeds provided by the programme require large 
amounts of fertiliser. Given that the use of manure as a fertiliser is limited because of land 
constraints which limit livestock ownership, farmers are left with very little option but to 
use the chemical fertilisers that are being provided by the programme in order to increase 
their productivity. There are, therefore, limits to farmers exploring alternatives that may 
be more appropriate for their soil fertility, and farmers continue to be highly dependent on 
chemical fertilisers. Continued, intensive use of chemical fertilisers, without 
complementary organic fertiliser use or other forms of soil management, may have 
detrimental environmental repercussions which may affect people’s livelihoods and 
worsen poverty. This presents a complex tension between increasing production and 
productivity, achieved through intensive chemical fertiliser use, and protecting the 
environment, and a need to find a sort of middle ground that allows for Malawi to still 
produce enough maize to feed its population, but without compromising the environment 
in such a way that may harm its people. 
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Reliable data on the effect of FISP on real incomes has been difficult to find. A 
study carried out by Ricker-Gilbert finds that “the net value of rainy season crop 
production (a measure of farm income) is positively affected by subsidy receipt in the 
year of receipt (but not subsequent years)” (as cited in Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a, p. 
136). A study of life histories, conducted by Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) found that, 
despite having continual access to subsidies, some households still struggle to produce 
maize that will be adequate to see them through to the next harvest season and so must 
work as casual labour on farms in order to earn an income that will enable them to 
purchase food. Increased maize production has contributed to lower maize prices, while a 
fall in the supply of casual labour has resulted in an increase in rural wages as the demand 
for casual labourers is high (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). As a result, most poor 
households have reported a preference for working as casual labour on farms in order to 
earn an income and purchase maize at a cheap price, as opposed to depending on growing 
it in order to sell it at a low price (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a).  
This further emphasises the failure of FISP to ensure both national and household 
food self-sufficiency, as well as highlights the programme’s limitations in ensuring that 
beneficiaries are able to produce enough food for their consumption, with the possibility 
of selling surplus. Although more conclusive studies on the programme’s impact on 
incomes is yet to be done, there are strong suggestions that the programme’s returns in 
terms of surplus production that can be sold for an income, are disappointing. Some 
possible causes for beneficiaries being unable to produce a surplus can be seen in the 
following section as we explore targeting in the programme which has led to uneven 
distribution of subsidies amongst households. 




FISP is a targeted input subsidy programme that is designed to prioritize the poor 
and vulnerable, with targeting occurring at both the area and beneficiary levels, meaning 
that particular areas are targeted, and then particular beneficiaries are targeted within the 
targeted areas. The targeting criteria for FISP has changed over the years since the 
programme’s implementation in 2005/06.  
In 2005/06 and 2006/07, coupon allocation was nominally done in proportion to 
extension planning maize and tobacco areas (or EPAs) although, in reality, it was highly 
inconstant. There was ad hoc district allocation of any extra coupons (Dorward & Chirwa, 
2013). In 2007/08 and 2008/09, area targeting changed from being solely based on EPA 
maize and tobacco areas to being based on EPA maize and tobacco areas as well as the 
number of farm households per district (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013, p. 7). Dorward and 
Chirwa (2013) note that, overall, the area targeting criteria was unclear, and there was ad 
hoc distribution of additional coupons (p. 7). In 2009/10, the district and EPA allocation 
criteria was opaque and inconstant, and area targeting was based more on the number of 
farm households in each district (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013, p. 7). The criteria for area 
targeting described above is not one that has been based on the level of poverty in each 
region, yet it is important to determine the extent to which regional poverty may be 
considered and addressed through area targeting, in order to determine whether or not 
area targeting under FISP resembles the pro-poor approach that the programme seeks to 
take. Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of the poor in rural areas of the North, 
Centre and South region between 2004/05 and 2010/11. Understanding the distribution of 
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the poor in these regions will assist in gaining better comprehension of whether area 
targeting at the regional level favours the poorest regions, has a more equitable approach, 
or one that is in favour of the richer regions. 
Table 3.1 
Distribution of poor in rural areas of the North, Centre and South region, 2004/05 and 
2010/11 
 
% Population % Malawian poor % Poor in region 
% Ultra poor in 
region 
 
04/05 10/11 04/05 10/11 04/05 10/11 04/05 10/11 
Rural 
North 10.2 11.2 10.9 13.2 56.3 59.9 25.9 29 
Rural 
Centre 38.1 36.1 33.9 34.6 46.7 48.7 16.2 21.5 
Rural 
South 40.4 37.6 49.7 46.9 64.4 63.3 31.5 34.2 
Urban 11.3 15.2 5.5 5.2 25.4 17.3 7.5 4.3 
Note. Adapted from NSO (2012, p. 208) and NSO (2005, p. 140) 
*Measurements of poor and ultra-poor are based on consumption per capita on food and non-food 
items. In 2004/05, the poverty line stood at MK16,165 per person, and the ultra-poverty line stood 
at MK10,029 per person (NSO, 2005, p. 138). In 2010/11, the poverty line stood at MK37,002 
while the ultra-poverty line stood at MK22,956 per person (NSO, 2012, p. 204). Changes largely 
have to do with the inflation rate. 
 
Table 3.1 shows that the rural North has the lowest population, while the rural South has 
the highest population, and the rural Centre has one slightly below that of the rural South. 
The rural South not only has the highest percentage of Malawi’s population, but also has 
the highest percentage of Malawi’s poor, and the highest number of poor and ultra-poor 
people as a percentage of its total population. The rural North, on the other hand, has the 
lowest percentage of Malawi’s poor, but has a higher number of poor and ultra-poor 
people as a percentage of its total population than the rural Centre. Given this data, 
regional targeting that prioritizes the poor would prioritize the rural South. 
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With an understanding of the distribution of poverty within each region, the 
percentage of beneficiary households by region must be considered in order to gain a 
better understanding of the area distribution of subsidies. 
 
Table 3.2 
Percentage of beneficiary households by region, 2006/07 – 2010/11 
 2006/07 2008/09 2010/11 
North 62 72 76 
Centre 55 65 69 
South 51 67 89 
    
Note. Adapted from Dorward and Chirwa (2013, p. 9) 
 
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of beneficiary households by region from 2006/07 to 
2010/11. 
All three regions show an increase in the percentage of beneficiary households between 
2006/07 and 2010/11. The most significant increase has been in the South region, but it 
only exceeded that of the North after 2008/09, showing favouritism of the North region 
over the South prior to the percentage of beneficiary households in the South exceeding 
that of the North. In 2010/11, the percentages of beneficiary households in each region 
reflected a more pro-poor approach in that the South had the highest percentage of 
beneficiaries, while the Centre had the lowest. While this may suggest that there is now a 
more pro-poor approach, with the South region having the highest percentage of 
beneficiary households, we must also analyse the number of coupons received by each 
household in each region in order to better understand the regional distribution of the 
subsidy. 
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Table 3.3 
Percentage of beneficiary households receiving between one and more than two 
coupons by region, 2006/07 – 2010/11 
 
North Centre South 
 
06/07 08/09 10/11 06/07 08/09 10/11 06/07 08/09 10/11 
1 coupon/hh 29 19 31 52 63 60 55 58 56 
2 coupon/hh 60 69 63 39 32 38 37 38 42 
+2 coupons/hh 11 11 7 9 5 2 8 5 2 
TOTAL 100 99 101 100 100 100 100 101 100 
Note. Adapted from Dorward and Chirwa (2013, p. 9) 
*Percentage totals that are 99 or 101 may be due to the rounding off of figures in the original 
source. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of beneficiary households receiving between one and 
more than two coupons in each region between 2006/07 and 2010/11. Each FISP subsidy 
package should contain two coupons. Between 2006/07 and 2010/11, the North region 
had the highest number of households receiving FISP packages complete with two 
coupons. Although the Centre and South region households have had an increasing 
percentage of beneficiary households receiving complete packages, their percentages 
remain substantially lower than those in the North. Most of the beneficiaries in the Centre 
and South region received FISP packages with only one coupon between 2006/07 and 
2010/11, and there has been an increase in the number of beneficiaries in the North region 
also receiving only one coupon. As highlighted in Chapter Two, farmers may end up with 
only one coupon because they have to share with other households who may be on the list 
of beneficiaries but do not get coupons. There has been a decline in the number of 
farmers receiving more than two coupons in all three regions and, in the North, this 
coincides with the termination of second round allocations, which further suggests the 
highly corrupt nature of those allocations. The percentage of beneficiary households 
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receiving more than two coupons in the North, however, is still concerning as it highlights 
the number of people in the region receiving more coupons than those that should be in 
each package, while there is a marked increase in the percentage of beneficiary 
households receiving incomplete packages. 
From Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we can see that the North has been favoured over 
the other two regions in terms of its percentage of beneficiary households and the number 
of coupons these households receive, even though the South region has a higher number 
of poor people than the North. Although as of 2010/11, the South region had the highest 
number of beneficiaries, most of these beneficiaries did not receive complete subsidy 
packages, while most of the beneficiaries in the North region received complete packages.  
The favouritism of the North region prior to 2009/10 can be owed to former 
President Bingu waMutharika’s need for political support in the North region given that 
he had no base when he came to power in 2004 and needed to win support from the swing 
voting region. The decrease in disparities among the regions after 2008/09 may be due to 
the removal of the second-round allocations, which favoured the North, and a more 
secure position for the president after the 2009 elections. This shows the sensitivity of 
area targeting to political manipulation and patronage that may affect pro-poor targeting, 
and reflects the appealing nature of concrete donations – in this case coupons that can be 
exchanged for seed and fertiliser – put forward by Kelsall (2011), and their ability to 
influence people’s political support in Malawi.  
Although FISP’s area targeting criteria has been based on EPAs and the number 
of farm households per district, this has been highly inconstant and, in its inconsistency, 
has not reflected the pro-poor approach that the programme aims to take but rather a 
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preference of the North region over the Centre and South regions. This highlights 




Having discussed area targeting, we now turn to beneficiary targeting in FISP. 
The number of FISP beneficiary households has changed over the years, and figures on 
their exact numbers each year are, at best, estimates. Pauw and Thurlow note that FISP 
“only targets about 1.5 million or half of all Malawian smallholder households” (2014, p. 
1). The beneficiary targeting criteria for FISP has seen some changes since its 
implementation. When FISP was first implemented in 2005/06, the targeting criteria was 
unclear (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). In 2006/07, the criteria for receipt was being a full 
time smallholder farmer who could not afford one or two bags of unsubsidised fertiliser, 
although, in reality, the probability of households that purchased commercial fertilisers in 
the previous season not receiving coupons was 0.02 percent, meaning that households that 
could afford to purchase their own fertiliser were still highly likely to receive coupons 
(Chirwa, Matita & Dorward, 2013; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). In 2007/08, vulnerable 
households, comprising of child-, female-, or orphan-headed families, came to be added 
to the targeting criteria (MoAFS, 2007). In 2008/09, resource-poor local residents who 
had land and guardians of physically challenged persons also came to be added to the 
criteria, and people living with HIV/AIDS were included as part of vulnerable households 
(Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). The elderly were added to vulnerable households in 2009/10 
(Dorward & Chirwa, 2013) and, in 2010/11, it became a requirement that beneficiaries 
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possess a voter registration card for the purposes of identification (Dorward & Chirwa, 
2011a). 
Studies on beneficiary targeting provide data on different vulnerable groups and 
the accessibility of coupons. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) note that, in 2006/07 and 
2010/11, the proportion of male-headed households that had access to coupons exceeded 
that of female-headed households, but female-headed households had a slightly higher 
proportion than male-headed households in 2008/09. Moreover, a study carried out by the 
School of Oriental and African Studies et. al shows that “male-headed recipient 
households tended to receive more maize fertiliser coupons than female-headed recipient 
households” (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a, p. 237).  In some communities, having enough 
money to pay the additional costs for subsidised fertiliser was a precondition for fertiliser 
coupon receipt, reducing the likelihood of the poor to receive coupons (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013a). Chirwa and Dorward also note that the requirement for identification 
documents also excluded some vulnerable groups from access to coupons (2013a). 
Regarding landholdings, the World Bank (2013) states that households with larger 
landholdings are more likely to receive coupons, with “a 25 percentage point difference 
between the land poor and the land rich” (p. 45). In some cases, the number of coupons 
delivered to a community are inadequate compared to the number of people registered or 
eligible to receive coupons under FISP, and this has led to some of the most vulnerable 
households being excluded, or the sharing of coupons, with vulnerable and poorer 
households being more likely to share their coupons with households that are excluded 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). 
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Although the beneficiary criteria has changed and become more inclusive, through 
encompassing more vulnerable groups, some vulnerable groups continue to be 
marginalized. With the ability to purchase commercial fertilisers in the previous season 
not serving as a hindrance to the receipt of coupons, this increases the number of 
beneficiary households that are better off receiving coupons that poorer households could 
receive. The preference for those who are land rich when it comes to coupon receipt is 
understandable, as those with no land cannot utilize fertilisers and may sell them to better 
off farmers, thus resulting in the leakage of coupons to richer farmers, as is warned by 
Tiba (2011), but those with small pieces of land should not be overlooked. Registration 
inefficiencies that resulted in an inadequate amount of coupons have worsened the 
marginalisation and exclusion of some vulnerable groups through coupon sharing.  
The precondition, in some communities, that recipients must have enough money 
to pay the additional cost for subsidised fertiliser in order to receive coupons, limits the 
poor’s access to coupons, further hindering an effective targeting of the vulnerable and 
poor. This is not a precondition set by the programme itself, and highlights the ability of 
traditional authorities to manipulate targeting as they identify beneficiaries for the 
programme. The requirement that beneficiaries be full time smallholder farmers may also 
marginalize some of the poor and vulnerable who may not have been involved in full time 
farming due to poor yields and the need to search for other work for an income.  
From an analysis of the beneficiary criteria, it becomes apparent that some of the 
conditions put in place for coupon receipt are in conflict with prioritising the poor. 
Although the beneficiary criteria may prioritise poor and vulnerable populations, some 
elements of the criteria contribute to their marginalisation rather than their inclusion. 
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There is tension that exists between targeting the poor and ensuring that certain 
conditions, which would increase the likelihood of the efficient use of fertiliser subsidies, 
such as land availability and adequate money for coupon redemption, are met, and poor 
and vulnerable groups stand at a disadvantage.  
With an understanding of FISP’s beneficiary criteria and its contradictory nature, 
we now turn to look at how it is that the subsidies have been shared amongst different 
poverty/wealth status groups in order to determine the extent to which the programme 
prioritises poorer farmers, who were more likely to use fewer, if any inputs, prior to FISP. 
Table 3.4 shows FISP beneficiary households by their wealth/poverty status in 2011.  
Table 3.4  
FISP beneficiary households by wealth/poverty status, 2011 
Status Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest  
% of Recipients 46 55 60 57 48 
Note. Adapted from World Bank (2013, p. 46) 
The statuses of the beneficiary households range from the poorest to the richest, 
with three quintiles between them: Q2, Q3 and Q4. In 2011, the poorest quintile had the 
lowest percentage of recipients, while two of the three richest quintiles had the highest 
percentage of recipients. Based on the number of beneficiary households as a percentage 
of their respective wealth/poverty status group, we see that the poorest group is not 
prioritised, and that it is poverty/wealth groups that are better off that are prioritised in 
terms of beneficiary household numbers. This reflects an approach to targeting that is not 
pro-poor. When we analyse the share of the subsidies that each wealth/poverty group 
status received in 2011, however, the beneficiary households in the poorest quintile seem 
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to be better off. Table 3.5 shows the FISP net subsidy share for rural populations by 
wealth/poverty status in 2011. 
Table 3.5  
FISP net subsidy share for rural population by wealth/poverty status, 2011 
Status Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest TOTAL 
Net subsidy 
share % 
19.6 20.0 20.3 20.3 19.8 100 
Note. Adapted from World Bank (2013, p. 46) 
Table 3.5 shows that the poorest receive the lowest net subsidy share, while two of 
the three highest quintiles get the highest. Although there are differences in the net 
subsidy share, the distribution is more or less equal amongst the five wealth/poverty 
status groups. Given that the percentage of beneficiaries in the poorest quintile was the 
lowest of the five groups, but the net subsidy share for each group was more or less the 
same, it can be suggested that, on average, the poorest quintile received a higher net 
subsidy share per beneficiary household than other quintiles, but not significantly higher. 
Nevertheless, this still does not reflect a pro-poor approach.  
The data above does not provide information on the number of bags of fertiliser 
each beneficiary household received, which is necessary to know in order to better 
determine which wealth/poverty status groups are benefitting the most from the 
programme in terms of the amount of subsidised fertiliser they are receiving. It is worth 
restating that each FISP subsidy package provides two coupons for farmers, with each 
coupon being the value of one bag of fertiliser, although an additional MK500 must be 
paid. Households receiving less than two bags of fertiliser are, therefore, not receiving the 
complete package. 
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Table 3.6 shows the percentage of households receiving either no subsidy, one bag 
or less of fertiliser, or more than one bag of fertiliser by poverty/wellbeing group in 
2010/11. 
Table 3.6  
Percentage of households in each poverty group receiving fertiliser bags, 2010/11 
Poverty/wealth 
status* 
No subsidy One bag or 
less per 
household (%) 





Poorest 28.6 47.6 23.8 100 
Poor 17.9 48.7 33.3 100 
A bit poor 20 48 32 100 
Better off 20 26.7 53.3 100 
Note. Adapted from Dorward and Chirwa (2013, p. 11) 
*Poverty/wellbeing groups are based on the perceptions of households of their own poverty or 
wellbeing (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013, p. 10). There are six groups in total, with the richest three 
being represented by the ‘better off’ status (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013, p. 11). 
 
 From Figure 3.6, we see that most of the beneficiary households in the three 
poorest groups (poorest, poor, and a bit poor) did not receive complete subsidy packages 
as they got one bag or less of fertiliser, yet those who identified as being better off, or a 
part of the three richest wealth/poverty status groups received more than one bag of 
fertiliser. Receiving more than one bag of fertiliser does not necessarily translate to 
receiving two bags of fertiliser, or the 100kg of fertiliser that each beneficiary household 
is entitled to, but it still remains apparent that those who were better off received more 
fertiliser from the subsidy programme than the poorer groups. 
 In order to understand the prioritising of better off groups in the programme’s 
implementation, we can look to the political influence in targeting that has been raised in 
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Chapter Two. The open meetings that were being used to allocate and distribute coupons 
in 2010/11 sometimes involved little to no active participation of the farmers but, instead, 
the farmers would be informed of who was to receive coupons without being given an 
opportunity to participate (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). This suggests that traditional 
authorities may have used this as an opportunity to allocate and distribute coupons to 
better off farmers as a form of patronage, and reflects some of the concerns raised in the 
literature on participatory development, whereby participatory approaches can still reflect 
a top-down approach, the facilitator is able to control participation through choosing 
which topics are covered, which questions are asked, and who is included and excluded in 
the conversation, and power relations within the participating group may influence the 
representativeness of responses given or decisions made (Kapoor, 2005; Mosse, 2001).  
With less coupons than were needed being available, it was often the coupons of poorer 
farmers that were redistributed, or poorer farmers who had to share their fertiliser with 
households that were registered as beneficiary households but did not receive coupons 
due to less than the required number being delivered (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013; Dorward 
& Chirwa, 2013a). We can also go back to the contradictory nature of the beneficiary 
criteria, which may also have contributed to the lack of a pro-poor approach in practice 
for FISP.  
Malawi has some social safety net instruments such as public work programmes 
and cash transfers. According to the World Bank (2013), of these various instruments that 
aim to reach the vulnerable and the poor, “FISP mobilizes over 80% of the financial 
resources available” (p. 45). Given that FISP mobilizes the majority of these funds, the 
programme has a responsibility to reach the vulnerable and the poor. Since the 
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implementation of FISP, however, there have been mixed results in terms of changes in 
national poverty, with most of these changes being an increase in the poverty headcount. 
In 2004/05, prior to the implementation of FISP, the national poverty headcount stood at 
52.4 percent, while the extreme poverty headcount stood at 22 percent (ASWAp TWG on 
M&E, 2013). Although the national poverty headcount had fallen to 50.9 percent by 
2010/11, the extreme poverty headcount had risen to 25 percent (ASWAp TWG on M&E, 
2013, p. 2). The rural poverty headcount increased from 55.9 percent to 56.6 percent 
between 2004/05 and 2010/11, while the rural extreme poverty headcount increased from 
24.3 percent in 2004/05 to 28.1 percent in 2010/11 (ASWAp TWG on M&E, 2013). Both 
the urban poverty headcount and the urban extreme poverty headcount fell between 
2004/05 and 2010/11, contributing to the decrease in the national poverty headcount 
(ASWAp TWG on M&E, 2013, p. 2). From this, and the beneficiary targeting in the 
programme, it can be deduced that FISP has not been successful in adequately reaching 
the poor and the vulnerable, and rural poverty has increased since the programme was 
introduced, which is concerning given that the programme is mainly directed towards 
rural areas, and accounts for over 80 percent of the financial resources that are available 
as social safety nets for the poor and vulnerable.  
 While FISP aims to prioritise the poor and vulnerable in its targeting, this has not 
translated in its implementation. The programme suffers from a contradictory beneficiary 
criteria which, in some instances, marginalises the poor and vulnerable. As a result of 
this, as well as political manipulation at the regional level, which may also take place at 
the beneficiary level, the programme, in practice, is not pro-poor in its targeting, often 
benefitting those who are better off more than the poor. While the ability of a smart 
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subsidy programme to reduce poverty is also partly dependent on other complementary 
programmes being in place, as is stated by Baltzer and Hansen (2011), it may be a 
challenge to fully develop other complementary programmes that are designed to address 
the poor and vulnerable if FISP is already consuming a significant amount of the 
resources available.  
We now turn to private sector involvement in FISP. 
 
Private Sector Development 
 FISP has involved the private sector in the different aspects of the programme at 
different times, from fertiliser procurement and transportation to distribution. The private 
sector was only involved in the retail of subsidised fertilisers in 2006/07 and 2007/08, but 
has since been sidelined because of unsubstantiated reports made by the government of 
corruption and mishandling of coupons (see Chapter Two), although it continues to 
participate in the distribution of non-subsidized fertilisers, which can also be referred to 
as commercial fertilisers. While there are no clear reasons for the abrupt termination of 
private sector involvement in fertiliser retail in 2008/09, other than the reports made by 
the government, the absence of private sector participation in retail allows the 
government to monopolise the distribution of subsidised fertiliser. Seeing the exclusion of 
the private sector from subsidised fertiliser retail solely as a matter of corruption is 
problematic given the evidence that has been found of corruption in the public sector in 
subsidised fertiliser retail over the years, which would then disqualify both private and 
public retailers. The termination of private sector participation in subsidised fertiliser 
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retail in FISP based on accusations that are unsubstantiated highlights how prone the 
subsidy programme is to government manipulation to the state’s benefit.  
The transportation of fertiliser to retail outlets from national depots is a service 
provided solely by the private sector, with no state involvement, and the number of 
transporters participating in the programme has increased from 16 transporters in 2008/09 
to 23 transporters in 2011/12 (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a; Chirwa and Dorward, 2013c). 
Most of the contracts that have been awarded to transport services have been given to 
companies that have close links with the ruling party (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). This 
could serve as a possible reason for the increase in participation in transportation, as 
transporting companies closely linked to the ruling party may feel encouraged to 
participate, with a higher likelihood of their bids getting accepted, and the opportunity to 
profit from participating in the programme. 
Since 2009/10, there has been an increase in the involvement of the private sector 
in FISP when it comes to procurement because of an increase in business opportunities in 
fertiliser supply (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). In 2009/10, 24 bids were awarded to the 
private sector in fertiliser procurement, a number that reached 65 in 2011/12 (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013c). While only 10 contracts to supply fertilisers to the programme were 
awarded to the private sector in 2009/10, in 2011/12, 20 new contracts were awarded 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). There have been new companies that have been set up 
solely to bid for supply contracts (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). These companies are also 
closely linked to the ruling party, but when they have been awarded bids, some have been 
unable to fulfil their deliveries at the given time but have been granted extensions without 
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penalty, resulting in delays, with some companies delivering fertiliser that was due before 
the first rains in October 2011, in February 2012 (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c).  
 Although there may be notable private sector participation in fertiliser 
procurement and transportation for FISP, the power that the government has to award 
bids for these services and the close ties between the ruling party and some of the private 
sector companies that are awarded bids shows that the private sector is not entirely 
independent from decisions made by the government, likely influenced by patronage. In 
the case of fertiliser procurement, we see the participation of inefficient private sector 
companies who are unable to meet their deliveries on time, but are granted extensions by 
the government, with no consequence. There is similarity to these cases and the bailing 
out of the private sector discussed by Chang (2008) (see Chapter Three), but instead of 
the government bailing out private sector firms that are significant contributors to the 
economy, we see the government supporting private sector firms that are aligned with the 
ruling parties interests, and sometimes at the expense of the programme due to delays that 
arise in deliveries. It must be reiterated, however, that delays in fertiliser procurement 
may also have to do with the government awarding tenders late to the extent that prices 
for inputs increase and suppliers will be unable to meet the quantities agreed upon on 
time (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). This was the case in June 2006/07 and June 2008/09 
(Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c).  
 Having looked at the different services provided by the private sector and 
parastatals in FISP, we now turn to examine the participation of the public and private 
sector in fertiliser procurement in order to gain a better understanding of the private 
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sector’s role and contribution to this aspect of the programme, and as part of 
understanding if and how the private sector has been developed through FISP. 
Table 3.7 shows the share of fertiliser supplied by each sector in terms of volume, 
value and percentage between 2007/08 and 2011/12. 
Table 3.7  
Share of subsidised fertiliser supplied by each sector (volume, value and percentage), 
2007/08 to 2011/12 
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11* 2011/12* 
Volume (MT)      
Parastatal  40,330 22,918 8,000 8,000 40,000 
Private 97,845 162,840 68,998 152,000 100,000 
Value ($million)      
Parastatal 22.64 30.55 5.94 5.71 25.66 
Private 54.10 203.76 51.24 109.57 91.02 
Supply (%)      
Parastatal 29.2 12.4 10.4 5 28.6 
Private 70.8 87.6 89.6 95 71.4 
Note. Adapted from Chirwa & Dorward (2013c, p. 5) 
*There was no supply of tobacco fertiliser in the 2010/11 and 2011/12 season. 
 
 Table 3.7 shows that, while the volume and value of subsidised fertiliser procured 
by the private sector fluctuated between 2007/08 and 2011/12, peaking in 2008/09 
because of a hike in international fertiliser prices, the percentage supply between 2007/08 
and 2010/11 increased, reaching 95 percent. The growing reliance on the private sector 
may have to do with the increasing number of private companies that are getting involved 
in the procurement of fertiliser for FISP, and further highlights the increased private 
sector participation in subsidised fertiliser supply. In 2011/12, we see that the programme 
cut down on the total amount of fertiliser that was provided, yet more money was paid for 
it, which indicates a notable increase in the cost of fertiliser. 
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Input subsidy programmes are accused by some of displacing commercial 
fertiliser purchases. According to SOAS, in 2004/05, the private sector had an 87 percent 
share of fertiliser sales, but this fell to 41 percent in the first year of FISP’s 
implementation, 2005/06, when 60 to 70 percent of the fertiliser retail outlets shut down 
due to reduced fertiliser sales (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). Table 3.8 shows the total 
amount of fertiliser imported and the available commercial fertiliser from 2004 to 2011. 
Table 3.8 
Total fertiliser imports and available commercial fertiliser in Malawi, 2004 to 2011 










197.5 235 77.5 60 140 102.5 182.5 130 
         
Note. Adapted from Chirwa and Dorward (2013c, p. 6) 
Table 3.8 shows that the volume of total imports and available commercial 
fertiliser in Malawi fluctuated between 2004 and 2011, but since the implementation of 
FISP, the volume of available commercial fertiliser has not reached pre-subsidy levels, 
remaining below 190,000 tonnes. In 2006 and 2007, the decline in available commercial 
fertiliser can be explained by the introduction of FISP, which saw a significant increase in 
the amount of subsidised fertiliser, prompting the shutting down of some private fertiliser 
retail outlets, as described above. After 2007, however, although the amount of available 
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commercial fertiliser continued to fluctuate, it registered as higher than the first two years 
of the subsidy programme, which may suggest that, although there may have been high 
displacement of commercial fertiliser sales in the programme’s first two years of 
implementation, this has since improved. This improvement may have to do with the 
exclusion of tobacco fertilisers from FISP in 2010/11 and 2011/12, which is important as 
a previous study by SOAS shows that there was higher displacement in tobacco fertiliser 
than in maize fertiliser (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). The exclusion of tobacco fertiliser 
from FISP in 2011, as well as a collapse of tobacco prices in 2010/11, which led to a 
decline in demand for tobacco fertiliser as many farmers abandoned the crop, explains the 
decline in total fertiliser imports and available commercial fertiliser in 2011 (Chirwa & 
Dorward, 2013c). 
 While there may initially have been high displacement of commercial fertiliser 
upon FISP’s implementation, this has since declined over time, with the exclusion of 
tobacco fertilisers from the programme also playing a part in this. This suggests that the 
programme has encouraged commercial fertiliser sales over time, but not at the levels that 
existed prior to FISP, highlighting the displacement that still exists.  
In order to show the extent to which commercial fertiliser sales for the private 
sector have been affected by FISP, Table 3.9 shows the percentage of households 
purchasing commercial fertiliser from private companies, parastatals and other sources, 
which include clubs, cooperatives, traders, local markets, relatives and neighbours, 
between 2006/07 and 2010/11. 
Table 3.9  
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Percentage of households purchasing commercial fertiliser from source, 2006/07-
2010/11 
 2006/07 2008/09 2010/11 
Private companies 6 21 30 
Parastatals 18 15 13 
Other 76 64 57 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Note. Adapted from Chirwa and Dorward (2013c) 
 Between 2006/07 and 2010/11, the percentage of households purchasing 
commercial fertiliser from private companies has increased, while it has decreased for 
parastatals. For other sources, traders and local markets have seen a decrease in the 
percentage of households purchasing commercial fertiliser from them, while 
relatives/neighbours and clubs/cooperatives have seen an increase.  
 Private company outlets have seen an increase in the average amount of 
commercial fertiliser purchased per household, with households purchasing an average of 
9 kg of fertiliser from them in 2006/07, a figure that rose to 42 kg in 2008/09 and again 
2010/11 to 60 kg (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013c). 
With an increase in the percentage of households purchasing commercial fertiliser from 
private companies, as well as an increase in the average amount of commercial fertiliser 
purchased per household from private companies, we see that the private sector involved 
in commercial fertiliser sales has thrived under FISP. 
 As has already been noted in Chapter Two, Malawi’s fertiliser blending plants 
have limited capacity that only allows them to provide for estate farmers (GoM, n.d.). As 
a result, fertiliser, both subsidised and non-subsidised, is imported from different 
countries such as Switzerland, South Africa and the UAE, and so there is a substantial 
amount of money flowing outward to sustain the subsidy programme while continuing to 
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benefit large fertiliser exporting companies in other countries (WITS, 2015). Both the 
smart subsidy model and FISP do not address the issue of dependence on fertiliser 
imports and, in supporting the promotion of the private sector, do not specifically 
encourage the development of the domestic private sector in the manufacturing of 
fertiliser in order to lower costs or decrease the country’s dependence on the international 
market. The implications of this on Malawi’s long-term development shall be discussed 
further in Chapter Five.  
 From this section, we see that, although the private sector has been excluded from 
participating in subsidised fertiliser retail, it has grown in subsidised fertiliser 
procurement and transport, but the participation of the private sector in FISP is largely 
controlled by the government, which awards tenders to private sector companies wishing 
to participate, with the opportunity to use this participation a source of patronage. During 
FISP’s implementation, the private sector that is involved in sales of commercial fertiliser 
has also thrived over the years after an initial decline. 
We now turn to an examination of the costs and funding of FISP as part of 
understanding the programme’s financial sustainability. 
 
Costs and Funding of FISP 
FISP is an expensive programme, and its introduction brought along a hike in the 
government’s agricultural expenditure. Between 2000/01 and 2004/05, the government’s 
agricultural expenditure, which was that of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS) and the Department of Irrigation, was between $20 million and $30 million, but 
shot up to $175 million in 2005/06 when FISP was launched (World Bank, 2013, p. 36). 
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The actual expenditures of MoAFS and the Department of Irrigation were above the 
approved budget from the year of FISP’s implementation and the three years that 
followed it by 36 percent, but from 2009/10 to 2011/12, they fell within the budget 
(World Bank, 2013, p. 36). This suggests that, for the four years that MoAFS and 
Department of Irrigation expenditures were above budget, they were eating into the 
resources of other programmes. 
Table 3.10 shows the programme costs for FISP between 2005/06 and 2012/13. 
Table 3.10 
Programme costs ($USmillion), 2005/06 to 2012/13  
 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 
Total 
costs* 




32 73.9 107.26 251.79 118.40 151.17 140.97 144.66 
         
Note. Adapted from Chirwa & Dorward (2013a, pp. 122-3) and Dorward et. al (2013). 
*Total costs are recorded and estimated costs, excluding stock carryover. 
**2005/06 total net costs are recorded costs 
***2006/07 to 2012/13 total net costs are recorded and estimated. 
 
From FISP’s implementation in 2005/06 to 2008/09, we see a rise in programme costs. 
2008/09 is particularly high, standing at $ 274.91 million in total costs and $251.79 
million in net costs because of the hike in international prices for fertiliser, which is the 
main component of the subsidy package in terms of cost and quantity. In 2009/10, 
programme costs declined, but remained above the cost for 2007/08, an indication that, 
even without the fertiliser price hikes, costs were continuing to rise, which they did again 
in 2010/11. Although total net costs declined in 2011/12, they rose again the following 
year.  
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Programme costs have significantly increased over the years, although they have 
been fluctuating since 2009/10, but still doing so at high costs. When the data in Table 
3.10 is compared to Table 3.7, we also see that, in 2011/12, although total and net costs of 
the programme declined from what they were in the previous year, the cost of fertiliser 
increased, which indicates that, even as costs and the amount of fertiliser have been 
scaled back, the cost of fertiliser continues to be a significant expense, and one that is 
increasing, which should raise concerns about the programme’s dependence on imported 
fertiliser that Malawi has little control over when it comes to price, yet urea and mineral 
and chemical fertilisers are the country’s third and fourth largest imports (WITS, 2015). 
Another cause of the increase in the cost of the programme has to do with farmer 
contributions. In 2005/06, beneficiary farmers were expected to pay an additional MK950 
for a bag of subsidised maize fertilizer, with 64 percent of the actual price of the bag of 
fertiliser being subsidised (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). In 2011/12, however, farmer 
contributions had fallen to MK500 for a bag of subsidised maize fertiliser, with 93 
percent of the actual price of the bag of fertiliser being subsidised (Chirwa & Dorward, 
2013a). As the actual cost of a bag of fertiliser has changed over the years, increasing due 
to price hikes in the 2008 global economic crisis, or increased transport and import costs, 
farmer contributions have been held constant at MK500 since 2009/10, meaning that the 
government has to bear a greater share of the cost. While the subsidy may mean that 
fertiliser has been cheaper for beneficiary households since 2009/10, it has only become 
more expensive for those who are not beneficiaries. The programme may be able to 
control maize prices, but it has little control over the cost of fertilisers, which are its 
greatest expense.  
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    111 
 
It is imperative to understand the way in which the cost of FISP relates to its 
budget, as well as other budgets, in order to determine the extent to which the 
programme’s costs are prepared for, and to gain some understanding of the amount of 
resources the programme has consumed from other budgets over time. This further assists 
in determining the extent to which the programme can be regarded as financially 
unsustainable, if at all. Table 3.11 shows the programme budget between 2005/06 and 
2012/13. 
Table 3.11  
Programme budget (US$million), 2005/06 to 2012/13 
 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 2009/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 
FISP 
budget 
36.43 53.57 82.14 139.14 155.04 129.99 129.48 131.81 
Total 
net costs 
32 73.9 107.26 251.79 118.40 151.17 140.70 144.66 












- 6.8 8.2 16.2 6.5 8.0 7.1 10** 
% of 
GDP 
- 2.5 3.1 6.6 2.5 3.0 2.7* 3.4* 
Note. Adapted from Chirwa & Dorward (2013a, pp. 122-3) 
*Total costs/GDP (World Bank, 2015) x 100 
** Taken from Dorward et. al (2013, p. 17) 
 
Between 2005/06 and 2009/10, FISP’s budget increased, and then fluctuated very 
slightly between 2010/11 and 2012/13, remaining fairly stable. With the exception of 
2009/10, FISP has been over its budget since 2006/07, and especially so in 2008/09, but 
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2011/12 and 2012/13 are years when FISP’s percentage of net costs over budget are at its 
lowest (not considering years when the programme is below budget). This indicates that 
there is a better gauging of the programme’s costs over the years, but this may change in 
the event of major price hikes.  
With the programme being over its budget for most of the years of its 
implementation, while the ministry which it is under, MoAFS, has been within its budget 
between 2009/10 and 2011/12, it can be suggested that, during those years, while the 
increasing FISP costs may not have intruded on resources designated for other 
programmes and projects outside of MoAFS, agricultural programmes and projects within 
the programme may have been affected. 
For most years of its implementation, FISP has accounted for more than half of 
the MoAFS budget. Between 2005/06 and 2008/09, FISP accounted for an increasing 
percentage of the MoAFS budget, but this percentage fell in 2009/10 as the amount of 
fertiliser purchased for the programme, as well as the cost for it declined. The following 
year saw an increase in the percentage of the MoAFS budget that FISP accounted for, but 
this declined again in 2011/12 as the country faced macroeconomic challenges, which 
may explain the scaling back of the programme. In 2012/13 however, the programme rose 
to accounting for 64.4 percent of the MoAFS budget, the highest since 2008/09. This 
further emphasizes the cost of the programme and the amount of resources that it takes 
from the MoAFS budget, leaving less resources available for other programmes within 
the ministry’s budget. 
FISP’s costs as a percentage of the national budget and the GDP follow a similar 
pattern as that of FISP as a percentage of the MoAFS budget, also highlighting the 
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programme’s cost, and how it is gradually consuming an increasing amount of public 
resources.  
Table 3.12 shows how funding for FISP was divided between the Malawian 
government and donors between 2005/06 and 2012/13. 
Table 3.12  
Funding for FISP (US$million), 2005/06 to 2012/13 
FUNDING 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 
Malawi 
govt. 




0.00 9.51 7.13 37.75 17.48 22.05 44.85 17.56 
% Govt. 
funding  




0 12.9 6.6 15 14.8 14.6 31.9 12.1 
Note. Adapted from Chirwa & Dorward (2013a, pp. 122-3) and Dorward et. al (2013, p. 106) 
*2005/06 Malawi government funding from total net costs of that year (Chirwa & Dorward, 
2013a) 
 
When FISP was first implemented, it was fully funded by the Malawian 
government (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013a). After impressive results in terms of substantial 
increases in maize production in its first year, donors began to assist in funding the 
programme. With the exception of 2011/12, when Malawi was facing macroeconomic 
challenges, the government has never funded less than 85 percent of the programme, 
which indicates a sort of consistency on the part of the government in being able to fund a 
set percentage of the programme. In 2011/12, direct donor funding was stepped up, with 
donors contributing $44.85 million, the greatest amount that they had contributed to the 
programme since its implementation, as well as the highest percentage, at 31.9 percent. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    114 
 
Macroeconomic challenges may significantly affect government funding for the 
programme, and it is at these times, as is shown in Figure 3.12, that donors are 
particularly important in funding the programme as they bear a greater financial burden 
than they may in the absence of macroeconomic challenges. The importance of Malawi’s 
relationship with its donors becomes apparent in these instances, and the compromise of 
these relationships due to corruption, as was the case upon the discovery of Cashgate, 
may have detrimental effects on the programme. 
The financial sustainability of FISP cannot be determined without a cost-benefit 
analysis of the programme. There are few cost-benefit analyses that have been carried out 
for FISP since its implementation, but they highlight the challenges in doing so, stating 
that there are difficulties in “determining appropriate maize prices and estimates of 
incremental production, [and] in estimating and allowing for indirect impacts of the 
programme” (Dorward & Chirwa, 2014, p. 17). Dorward & Chirwa (2014) note that 
FISP’s benefits, measured in terms of incremental maize production, producer maize 
surplus, consumer maize surplus and producer net gain in legumes, exceeded its costs in 
2013/14, but the benefit cost ratio was lower for that season than it was in 2012/13, which 
means that, in 2013/14, there were less benefits of FISP in relation to its costs than there 
were in 2012/13. 
The benefit cost ratio is sensitive to yield responses, maize prices, fertiliser prices, 
displacement/leakage and farmer contributions (Dorward & Chirwa, 2014). In evaluating 
FISP in 2013/14, Dorward and Chirwa (2014) note that programme costs would fall by 
about 4 percent if fertiliser costs were reduced by 5 percent, while tripling farmer 
contributions, while keeping farmer uptake, displacement and leakage constant, would cut 
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programme costs by US$7 million. If programme displacement and leakage is reduced 
from 30 percent to 10 percent, this could result in a 25 percent increase in incremental 
maize production. 
From the findings from the benefit cost ratio analysis carried out by Dorward and 
Chirwa (2014), we can deduce that, while FISP is more beneficial than it is costly, 
increasing efficiency and better cost management may make the programme more 
financially sustainable, although there may also be trade-offs, which will be discussed in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Lessons from Empirical Research 
Based on the above empirical research, the following can be deduced about FISP in 
Malawi and its implementation as a smart subsidy. FISP has contributed to significant 
increases in maize production, productivity and food self-sufficiency. Although the 
programme, by design, is targeted at poor and vulnerable households, parts of the 
beneficiary criteria are contradictory, and the criteria has not been followed in practice. 
Given that programmes of this nature are prone to being used as sources of patronage, it 
can be strongly suggested that political manipulation and patronage in targeting can also 
serve as a limitation to the adherence of the targeting criteria, and this may be one of the 
causes of better-off farmers benefitting from the programme over the poor. Other than 
leakage, this also results in the displacement of commercial fertiliser sales, and limits 
productivity as smallholder farmers are known to be more productive than those with 
larger land holdings in labour-intensive staple food crop production (Tiba, 2011).  
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Political manipulation and patronage within FISP can be considered to be a 
possibly significant characteristic when looking at the subsidy programme within the 
context of Malawi’s agricultural history. As shown in Chapter Two, we see that 
agricultural production has been a key feature of the country’s economy and its people’s 
livelihoods, and former presidents have used support for the agricultural sector as a way 
to gain votes or maintain power through patronage. Subsidies have been especially 
political, and FISP has been no exception. The power of traditional authorities, which 
could not be successfully challenged during colonial times, may also influence targeting 
in FISP, and this all highlights the proneness of targeting to political manipulation.  
 Although the government has ended private sector participation in subsidised 
fertiliser retail, FISP has encouraged private sector participation and development in 
subsidised fertiliser procurement and transportation, but this participation has been 
largely regulated by the government through the awarding of bids, and benefitted private 
firms with close ties to the ruling party. This emphasises the influence of the government, 
highlighting how the private sector is not necessarily entirely independent of it. Reports 
of late delivery, in part due to the failure of fertiliser suppliers to procure fertilisers in 
time, reflect how efficiency is not an inherent feature of private sector companies. Under 
FISP, non-subsidized fertiliser sales have flourished and although displacement remains a 
challenge in the programme, there are indications that it has declined.  
 FISP, however, has not promoted the development of the private sector in 
chemical fertiliser manufacturing, thus failing to address the country’s dependence on 
imported chemical fertiliser. Although the country has implemented this subsidy 
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programme in an effort to achieve food self-sufficiency, it is largely sustained by 
continued dependence on the international market for fertiliser. 
 FISP is, undoubtedly, an expensive programme with increasing costs and taking 
up an increasing amount of the MoAFS budget, the national budget and the GDP. The 
government has, for the most part, been consistent in its contribution to the programme, 
but there need to be more studies carried out on which programmes have missed out on 
resources because of FISP’s growing expenses. Fertiliser costs have been the greatest 
contributor to FISP’s expenses, and have increased over time, while farmer contributions 
have been held constant, creating a greater financial burden for the government. 
 Despite the increasing programme costs, the programme continues to have higher 
benefits than costs, but there has been a decline in this, with a need to reduce 
displacement and leakage, reduce fertiliser costs and increase farmer contributions in 
order to increase benefits and reduce the costs of the programme. 
 With all of this in mind, we can conclude that, while FISP has initiated significant 
productivity gains, pro-poor targeting in its design has not fully translated in the 
programme’s implementation due to corruption, political manipulation and ambiguous 
and contradictory targeting criteria; there has been limited private sector development in 
the subsidised fertiliser retail industry due to government restrictions; and the programme 
has been a significant fiscal burden on the state due to inefficiencies arising from poor 
targeting, corruption, political manipulation and poor cost management, as well as 
dependence on expensive fertiliser imports. In failing to mirror the three main 
characteristics of a smart subsidy in its implementation, we see that FISP has not been 
successfully implemented as a smart subsidy, and this highlights the limitations of 
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successfully implementing the smart subsidy model in the SSA context, and the need to 
revise and rethink the model to better address its limitations. In the next chapter, we 
discuss these limitations and how they can be addressed.  
THE LIMITATIONS OF SMART SUBSIDIES: A CASE STUDY OF FISP                                    119 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the last chapter, we provided, discussed and evaluated data on what has been 
coined one of the most successful smart subsidies to date, FISP. From our findings on 
FISP, this chapter now looks at the smart subsidy model and addresses the limitations to 
its successful implementation, particularly within the SSA context, revisiting the literature 
on smart subsidies provided in Chapter Three. With smart subsidies being located within 
the post-Washington consensus, this chapter shall then proceed to discuss the 
shortcomings of both the Washington and post-Washington Consensus in addressing 
development. Alternatives to these two paradigms shall then be explored. Taking these 
recommendations into consideration, as well as the limitations of smart subsidies, 
recommendations shall then be made on how FISP may become a more efficient 
programme, and make greater contributions to long-term development in Malawi. 
 
The Limitations of Successful Smart Subsidy Implementation in the SSA Context 
 The pro-poor targeting that is supported in the smart-subsidy model has its 
strengths in addressing poverty, reducing displacement of commercial sales of fertiliser 
and increasing productivity through targeting the more productive smallholder-farmers. 
The model also acknowledges the need for complementary programmes that will address 
market failures that confront the poor and hinder their efficient use of the subsidy.  
A pro-poor targeting approach may have its benefits, but we cannot ignore 
concerns raised by Tiba (2011) that a smart-subsidy runs the risk of leakage, and while 
leakage can be confronted through complementary programmes and clearer beneficiary 
criteria that is enforced, there are limits when pro-poor targeting is confronted by the 
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realities of the SSA context whereby patronage and political manipulation are often used 
in programmes of this nature. In some countries, traditional authorities hold great power 
and influence and cannot be excluded from the process of allocating and distributing 
resources in their communities, and coming from a colonial and post-colonial history in 
which patronage has become an increasing feature of gaining and maintaining support, 
particularly given the greater desirability for concrete donations (Kelsall (2011), this may 
still be used when it comes to subsidies. The same applies for the government, in which 
heads of state may use subsidies as patronage rather than adhering to a given criteria. 
Improvements may, and in the case of Malawi, have, been made in order to make the 
allocation and distribution process of coupons more transparent through open meetings 
but, once again, that does not always translate in practice.  
My point here is that, while pro-poor targeting has some benefits, and may 
achieve poverty reduction objectives when coupled with complementary programmes, it 
should be acknowledged that diversion of subsidies through patronage can be an 
impediment to pro-poor targeting within the existing SSA context.  
With respect to the development of the private sector, private sector participation 
in distribution can be supported on the basis that it may allow for remote areas to be 
reached, as we have seen in the case of Malawi, provided that there are incentives for the 
retailers to relocate, making it easier for smallholder farmers in remote areas to redeem 
their coupons, as well as on the basis that it may encourage efficiency in subsidised 
fertiliser retail through the promotion of competition, as Morris et. al (2007) argue. 
Regarding the efficiency of the private sector in service delivery, however, increased 
private sector participation does not always equate to increased efficiency in terms of 
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service delivery as has been seen in the case of Malawi, whereby private sector suppliers 
have failed to fulfil their deliveries on time.  
Another matter of note is that the government continues to have significant 
influence on which private sector companies will participate in the programme, if any at 
all. We have seen this in Malawi, Mali and Senegal, whereby private sector companies 
that are awarded contracts have close ties to the government. I shall not belabour the issue 
of patronage in the SSA context, but it is once again apparent in the private sector. If the 
government has interests in the private companies which it awards contracts, these 
companies may have ‘soft budgets’, not so much because of their economic worth to the 
government, but because of their ties to government officials. The power of governments 
in determining which and how many private companies, if any at all, will participate in 
the subsidy programme, based on their interests, can limit private sector participation, as 
has happened in private sector retail of subsidised fertiliser in Malawi. 
The ‘exit strategy’ feature of the smart subsidy is one that has been included in 
design in some smart subsidy programmes, but never been implemented, and so there is 
little known about its effects. There are, however, limitations to its successful 
implementation in the SSA context. Chirwa and Dorward (2013a) note that the lack of 
attention to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ when it comes to exit strategies has hindered their 
implementation in Zambia and Tanzania. What is also highlighted in Tanzania is the 
decision to extend its programme because of its success (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 
2012). The returns from subsidies, as well as their importance for agricultural production 
and productivity increases for beneficiaries mean that their removal may be unpopular 
amongst the masses and politically detrimental for the ruling party. We have already seen 
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the political importance of subsidies in Malawi in bringing and maintaining support for 
former president Mutharika.   
While these may be seen as limitations to the successful implementation of smart 
subsidies in the SSA context, it is also important to see them as limitations of the model 
itself in that it currently stands as an idea that is yet to be successfully implemented, 
raising questions about the practicality of such a model in the current SSA context. As a 
result, this gives rise to the need for the model to be revisited and designed in such a way 
that it addresses the factors that have limited its successful implementation in the 
countries under which smart subsidies are currently being implemented, and 
unsuccessfully at that. 
 Having discussed the limitations of successful smart subsidy implementation in 
the SSA context, we must now turn to whether or not the successful implementation of 
this model would be beneficial for long-term development.  
 
Smart Subsidies and Long-term Development 
 While pro-poor targeting may have its benefits, the smart subsidy model does not 
address the uneven playing field that is the international market, which means that there 
are some farmers who may be able to purchase their own fertilisers and, therefore not be 
eligible as beneficiaries, but whose produce will still have to compete with highly 
subsidised produce from developed countries. The smart subsidy model, therefore, does 
not do much to challenge the status quo, and with emphasis on the need for an exit 
strategy, means that poor smallholder farmers will continue to have to compete on 
international markets that are skewed against their favour. If Burkina Faso decides to 
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implement a smart subsidy programme under which its poorest cotton farmers are 
beneficiaries, will they not still have to compete with highly subsidised cotton from the 
USA, both during the programme’s implementation and after its termination? The smart 
subsidy programme does not adequately consider long-term effects on farmer livelihoods 
in the face of the existing food regime.  
Given that some developed countries such as the USA and the countries belonging 
to the EU subsidise their farmers without an exit strategy, there is need to address the 
need for an exit strategy in smart subsidies implemented in SSA. Proponents of smart 
subsidies state that the need for an exit strategy is based on growing inefficiency and 
unaffordability, but would it not be better to address these challenges rather than dismiss 
the whole programme after some years? As is argued by Dorward et al (as cited in 
Dorward, 2009), growing inefficiencies of subsidies should not nullify their benefits. I 
would go further to state that, especially in the event that a subsidy programme has 
benefits that exceed its costs, there is a need to address inefficiencies and improve cost 
management rather than bring the programme to an end. Efforts should be made to reduce 
costs through addressing poor targeting, displacement and leakage and high input costs. 
Baltzer and Hansen (2011) put forward the growing inefficiency and inequity of subsidies 
as features that arise as the programme extends over time. With Malawi’s FISP, we see a 
programme that, although still not pro-poor, is more equitable than it was a few years ago, 
and one in which measures such as ‘open meetings’ and the publicizing of lists of 
beneficiaries have helped to make the programme more equitable, and less inefficient, 
thus reducing displacement. Growing inefficiency and inequity in a subsidy programme 
are not inevitable if measures are taken to counter them.  
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 The smart subsidy model’s advocacy for environmental sustainability, while 
stating that farmers should be empowered to decide which soil fertility management 
methods is most appropriate for their particular context, assumes that there is synonymy 
between the two, falling into the ‘local trap’, whereby it does not acknowledge that 
farmers could choose soil fertility management methods that are not environmentally 
sustainable. With smart subsidies currently being implemented being largely dependent 
on chemical fertilisers, and no explicit and extensive discussion on how it is that 
environmental sustainability can be achieved, the model may result in farmers remaining 
on the ‘chemical treadmill’, and in long-term environmental degradation. 
 The final limitation of the smart subsidy model is that it does not address the 
dependence on imported fertilisers for countries that are implementing the programme 
and do not manufacture their own fertiliser. This is significant because, as in the case of 
FISP, fertilisers account for a significant amount of the programme’s costs, and this cost 
has increased over the last few years. When international prices for fertiliser peaked in 
2008, there was a surge in fertiliser costs and, resultantly, programme costs. In calling for 
an exit strategy because of increasing costs over time, the smart subsidy model does not 
give consideration to how these costs could better be controlled, with one of the ways 
being by addressing dependence on imported chemical fertiliser.  
The dependence on chemical fertiliser imports is not only problematic because of 
increasing fertiliser costs, but there could be positive development effects in the form of 
skill development and employment if countries learn to manufacture their own fertiliser, 
allowing them to break free from being largely dependent on primary industry based on 
their comparative advantage. We will discuss this further in the following section. By 
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failing to acknowledge and confront the dependency that is perpetuated under smart 
subsidy programmes, the smart subsidy model maintains the status-quo that has limited 
the development of many developing countries as it keeps them, in terms of dependency 
theory, as ‘countries in the periphery’.  
 
Neoliberalism and its Alternatives in Development 
The dominant discourse for development has pushed the neoliberal agenda onto 
developing countries, yet there are no developed countries that are fully neoliberal today, 
or were fully neoliberal in order to develop. As Fridell (2013) states: “Today’s world 
trading system is a complex mixture of tariffs, subsidies, trade embargoes, trade wars, 
selective liberalizations, unequal trade agreements and power politics that in no way 
resembles the models of neoclassical free trade…[T]he free trade world…never has 
existed” (pp. 1-2).  
Nevertheless, there has been a persistence to get developing countries to adopt 
neoliberal ideals, which, in many cases, have had detrimental effects on development 
rather than furthering it. In many cases, developing countries have been required to adopt 
neoliberal policies that are not adhered to by developed countries, often putting 
developing countries at a disadvantage when it comes to matters such as international 
trade. Policies that are not aligned to the neoliberal ideal, such as food self-sufficiency, 
have often been discouraged, yet they serve as cheaper and more beneficial options for 
some developing countries. The post-Washington consensus confronts the failure of the 
Washington consensus to address development beyond economic growth, and it takes the 
welfare of people into consideration, but it does not go far enough in breaking away from 
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the neoliberal mould. Looking specifically at the smart subsidy model that arises from the 
post-Washington consensus, there is a recognition of the need for state support and 
intervention, but only to address market failures (which, in this model, translates to 
prioritising the welfare of the poor by addressing the market failures that confront them) 
and promote private sector development, before it retreats through an exit strategy in 
order to avoid high costs and inefficiency.  
The smart subsidy model does not present long-term developmental prospects or a 
way out for the respective country from remaining dependent on agriculture as it adheres 
to its comparative advantage. This is very similar to Lin’s view of the facilitating state 
(Lin & Chang, 2009). The smart subsidy model, similar to neoliberal programmes that 
have been imposed on developing countries in the past, is not one that has been tried and 
successful in countries that are developed today, which should raise questions about 
whether or not it can bring about the promised results when successfully implemented. 
 Based on the above, I disagree with both the Washington and post-Washington 
consensus as routes to development as they have not been successful in countries that are 
developed today. The former has worsened conditions for developing countries rather 
than improved them, and the latter remains within the confines of the former. Given the 
historical failures of the neoliberal agenda, as well as the examples of development of 
developed countries, which do not reflect strong and unwavering commitment to 
neoliberal ideals, there is a need to continue and strengthen the challenging of the 
dominant discourse that is currently taking place, and for developing countries to seek 
alternatives to the road to development that has been presented to them. There should be 
greater circulation of development models, policies, projects or programmes that may not 
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be aligned with neoliberalism but have been successful in other developing countries, 
rather than the circulation of ideals that have never been put into practice, or been 
successful in bringing about development.  
While current global power relations may prevent or hinder the exploration of 
these alternatives, it must be noted that there is a shift in these power relations as other 
countries that are not in the global West, such as the BRICS, have gained power and 
influence. Alternative trade mechanisms are those that include social regulation, which is 
when “state action [is] conducted in the interest of maximizing social welfare”, and have 
a pro-poor agenda (Fridell, 2013, pp. 4-5) There are agreements that have been signed by 
various countries and do not reflect the neoliberal ideal, yet they have had notable 
successes in promoting development in certain sectors. Institutions such as the Bolivarian 
Alternative to the Americas (ALBA) have emphasized compensated trade, which has had 
some success in contributing to the development of some sectors in participating 
countries, and more attention should be drawn to these alternatives to the neoliberal 
model of development that have been successful in order to increase studies and 
participation within them (Kellogg, 2007).  
 
Recommendations for Malawi and FISP 
Malawi stands as the first country in SSA to reintroduce agricultural subsidies 
after all subsidy programmes in the region were discontinued, and FISP is a subsidy 
programme that many countries have begun to model their subsidy programmes after due 
to its successes. Although, according to neoliberals, subsidies are seen as harmful to a 
country’s development and have been discouraged as programmes that may assist in the 
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development of a country, the successful aspects of FISP highlight the subsidy 
programme as a viable option to increase food production, achieve national food self-
sufficiency and contribute to the food security of a country. The inefficiencies of the 
programme should not nullify its successes, and dismissing subsidy programmes as 
ineffective due to some inefficiencies that arise out of poor implementation is to ‘throw 
the baby out with the bathwater’. Moreover, given that some developed countries largely 
subsidise their wealthy farmers, and that these subsidies have been provided for many 
years, being an integral part of the development of the agricultural sector in these 
countries, although the form of the subsidies may be different, it is apparent that subsidy 
programmes do work. Rather than discouraging subsidy programmes in developing 
countries, or calling for exit strategies in order to limit their duration and government 
support for smallholder farmers who need it, there is a need for greater exploration of 
subsidy programmes, with particular emphasis on models that work within the given 
context.  
It is imperative, however, to note that, in the case of a country that is prone to 
natural hazards, such as Malawi, which was hit by heavy flooding at the beginning of 
2015, resulting in significant crop destruction and leaving many people in need of food 
aid, the results of subsidies and food self-sufficiency can be nullified by a disaster, 
resulting in an immediate need for aid or a disaster relief fund. In the case of Malawi, the 
floods have resulted in the MoAFS budget for 2015/16 being reduced from MK142 
billion to MK42 billion, with some funds being redirected to the Department of Disaster 
Risk Management (DoDMA), leaving less funds available, not only for MoAFS, but also 
for FISP (Nthala, 2015). These matters are still developing, but the limitations of FISP in 
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the face of natural disasters will be worth exploring as a future study. Malawi is also 
prone to droughts, and without a comprehensive irrigation scheme, input subsidies can do 
very little to promote agricultural productivity and keep production high in the face of a 
severe drought. 
 When it comes to targeting in FISP, the subsidy programme can be very prone to 
political manipulation. Increased transparency can be seen in the introduction of ‘open 
meetings’ in 2008/09, as well as the public availability of lists of beneficiaries (Dorward 
et. al., 2013). It is imperative, however, that farmers be aware of these meetings and lists, 
as well as participate in the decision making processes of the open meetings rather than 
being informed of beneficiaries. There is a need for greater smallholder farmer 
organisation which may assist in helping smallholder farmers advocate against corrupt 
practices in coupon targeting and allocation which favour some over others despite 
eligibility, and be active participants in determining beneficiaries. The beneficiary 
targeting criteria should be revamped in order for it to be less contradictory and clearer so 
that targeting can be less contentious. Targeting, in this particular instance, may be 
beneficial because of the large costs of the programme, which may not be sustainable if 
the programme becomes universal. Selecting a smaller number of beneficiaries who are 
poor smallholder farmers, but by some measure still considered potential efficient users 
of fertiliser subsidies in that they have an adequate amount of land and money to redeem 
the coupons, will be preferable to a pro-poor targeting approach that does not consider 
certain limitations of poverty for some smallholder farmers. This may also lead to lower 
costs for the programme as it may narrow down the number of beneficiaries.  
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What, then, should happen to the poorest farmers? As Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé 
(2012) note, without other supporting factors, fertiliser subsidies are not efficient in 
achieving poverty reduction objectives. If poor farmers do not have enough land to utilize 
the subsidy, or cannot afford to redeem their coupons by paying the additional cost for 
fertiliser, there is little sense in giving them coupons without expecting leakage or the 
development of a secondary market. Complementary programmes that address poverty 
may help to bring the poorest farmers to a point whereby they can be more efficient in 
their fertiliser use. These include the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program, which is 
currently in place, and public works programmes (Abdoulayi et. al, 2014). A significant 
issue for poor farmers is access to adequate amounts of land (see Chapter Two). With a 
land policy that has been dragging in terms of it being put into law and implemented, and 
the average land holding standing at 0.5 hectares, there are great limits to increasing one’s 
income through agriculture, even with subsidies available, and addressing the unequal 
distribution of land may serve as a significant step to addressing the poverty faced by 
some smallholder farmers.  
 Based on concerns of corruption in private companies involved in subsidised 
fertiliser retail earlier on in the programme, the Malawian government should open the 
door to private sector participation in this aspect of the programme, but mechanisms 
should be set up that allow for greater transparency and auditing. Concerns for corruption 
in the public and private sector should be addressed through greater anti-corruption 
measures. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the ACB has carried out some work in order to 
address corruption within the programme, particularly in fertiliser retail, increasing 
transparency and encouraging the public to report incidents of corruption. This has 
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resulted in some arrests, but more needs to be done as reports of corruption continue. If 
corruption, not only within the programme, is not addressed, this may lead to the 
withdrawal of donor funding to the government, as was the case after Cashgate, and this 
may have detrimental effects on a country that is largely dependent on donor funding. 
 The most important step in addressing FISP’s high costs has to do with addressing 
its most important feature; fertiliser. Given that the fertilisers used in the programme are 
the third and fourth largest imports into Malawi, and the cost of fertiliser is about three 
quarters of the total net costs of the programme, reducing the cost of fertiliser will be a 
significant part of better managing the costs of the programme.  
Malawi has very little, if any control over the cost of fertiliser on the international 
market. In confronting not only the high costs of fertiliser in Malawi, but also, in part, 
Malawi’s development strategy that keeps it as an economy largely dependent on primary 
industry as it adheres to its comparative advantage, we must look to the argument put 
forward by Chang on defying comparative advantage (Lin & Chang, 2009).  
In order to have better control over fertiliser costs in the long run, as well as to 
upgrade its industry, Malawi should defy its comparative advantage and look to 
producing its own fertiliser. Defying comparative advantage would be costly in the short-
run, but it would have long-term developmental gains (Lin and Chang, 2009). As 
prescribed by Chang for countries that would defy their comparative advantage, Malawi 
would need to adopt protectionist policies as it develops its fertiliser industry in order to 
reduce imports, particularly those that would compete with the new industry, and this 
would be an opportunity for jobs to be created and part of the workforce to be trained in a 
new industry (Lin & Chang, 2009). This, unlike neoliberal policies that have been put 
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forward for developing countries, is a developmental strategy that has been found to work 
in other countries such as Japan and South Korea, which gives it greater validity. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that other developed countries protected some of their 
industries in order to develop, and still do. 
The challenge, however, for Malawi in taking this approach is that it may face 
retaliation from other countries who will also put up trade barriers against its exports. 
This would be detrimental for the country’s economy, which largely depends on its 
tobacco exports. Moreover, this may deny smallholder farmers of much needed fertiliser 
as the country starts to manufacture its own fertiliser and develop the industry, with 
protectionist measures in place, causing a serious agricultural crisis. If Malawi, however, 
does not take this approach, it may be locked into dependence and underdevelopment for 
a very long time. 
 
FISP does not seem to be going anywhere any time soon, and so efforts should 
continue to be made to ensure increased efficiency of the programme with maximised 
benefits and minimised costs. The subsidy programme, however, obviously cannot 
address all of the agricultural and developmental problems in Malawi and, other than its 
inefficiencies, is also hindered by the poor performance of other complementary 
programmes. It is also important to keep in mind the context within which FISP has been 
implemented. Although the programme suffers from internal weaknesses, the externalities 
highlighted in Chapter Two, such as low social indicators, inequitable land distribution 
and security, macroeconomic challenges and exposure to global markets, also affect the 
way in which the programme is implemented and play a part in determining its overall 
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success. These externalities must not be overlooked, but adequately addressed as efforts 
are made to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of FISP. I hope that, in the future, 
there will be more harmonised efforts towards addressing food security in Malawi, and 
particularly at the household level, where it continues to be a challenge despite the 
country’s food self-sufficiency. The use of these programmes as patronage, however, and 
the protection of the interests of the elite which hinder progress where necessary, as in 
land reform, will need to be addressed by a well-organised, active and informed civil 
society in order to ensure equitable development.  
 As for Malawi, while the country has seen economic growth in some years, there 
is need for it, like many other developing countries, to break away from the neoliberal 
impositions that promise development but have never delivered. Small developing 
countries such as Malawi tend to have little bargaining power when they stand alone, and 
so there will be need for developing countries to come together in denouncing the 
neoliberal ideal and working together in its alternatives. 
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